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Part I of this of this Note will describe the evolution of United States antitrust laws and their
application to international joint ventures. Part II of this Note will then demonstrate, through an
analysis of the GM-Toyota decision, that the FTC’s settlement of its proceedings against GM and
Toyota embodies an industrial policy. Part III will show that implementation of an industrial policy
through the antitrust laws is logical, necessary, and above all, preferable to protectionist legislation
as a means of stimulating United States industrial competitiveness in world markets. Finally, this
Note will propose a program of restrictions, similar to those imposed in GM-Toyota, designed to
maximize the procompetitive benefits of international joint ventures.
UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AND INDUSTRIAL
POLICY: INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES
AND GLOBAL COMPETITION AFTER
GM- TO YOTA
INTRODUCTION
The effect of foreign competition on certain sectors of the
United States economy' has spurred demand for protectionist
1. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 813-21 (105th ed. 1985). The value of total merchandise imports rose from
U.S.$15 billion in 1960 to U.S.$258 billion in 1983. Id. During that same time pe-
riod, total merchandise exports rose from U.S.$19.6 billion to U.S.$200.5 billion,
resulting in a U.S.$57.5 billion merchandise trade deficit in 1983. Id. In 1965, the
United States had a trade surplus of U.S.$5.3 billion. Id. In 1976, the United States
had a trade deficit of U.S.$8.3 billion. Id. Merchandise exports to Japan were valued
at roughly U.S.$22 billion, while Japanese imports to this country were valued at
U.S.$41 billion, creating a U.S.$19 billion trade deficit with Japan alone in 1983. Id.
at 818. In 1970, the new automobiles imported into the United States were valued at
U.S.$3 billion. Id. at 821. This figure rose to U.S.$23 billion in 1983. Id.
In 1985 alone, foreign competition was largely responsible for the loss of
340,000 manufacturing jobs. Quint, Economy Gives Alternating Signals, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 14, 1985, at Dl, col. 3. Seventy-five percent of all products made in the United
States now face international competition. Baldridge, Luncheon Address, 53 ArI-
TRUST LJ. 397 (1984). Only eight percent of United States products were subject to
foreign competition in the early 1960s. Reich, The Next American Frontier, Atlantic
Monthly, Apr. 1983, at 97, 101. Imports climbed 26.4% in 1984. Hershey, Protection-
ism and U.S. Jobs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1985, at D2, col. 1. The United States trade
deficit reached U.S.$15.5 billion for the month of September, 1985, indicating that
United States consumers were purchasing foreign-made automobiles and other
goods rather than those manufactured in the United States. Farnsworth, U.S. Trade
Deficit Widens to Record as Imports Surge, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1985, at A1, col. 1. For
the year 1985, the United States trade deficit was a record U.S.$148.5 billion. Farns-
worth, Year's Trade Deficit Hit A Record $148.5 Billion, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1986, at Dl,
col. 1. The December, 1985, trade deficit was U.S.$17.4 billion, the highest monthly
total ever. Id. The trade deficit with Japan was U.S.$49.7 billion for 1985, one-third
of the total United States trade deficit and more than the combined deficits with
Western Europe and Canada. Id. The 1984 trade deficit with Japan was U.S.$37
billion. Id.
Analysts expect the United States trade deficit with Japan to continue to in-
crease. Farnsworth, Trade Gap with Japan Expected to Grow, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1985,
at Al, col. 3. "The Japanese undersell our manufactures [sic] and kill off thousands,
even millions, of jobs. Often these are our best industrial jobs-for example, the
$25,000 slots in the auto or steel industry upon which United States real income
supremacy has allegedly always been based." Samuelson, Where lacocca and Common
Sense Err, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1985, at D3, col. 1. "[T]he disappearing well-paid
factory jobs are being supplanted by low-wage service jobs, such as banktellers, hotel
clerks and workers in the fast-food industry." Noble, Study Finds 6076 of 11 Million
Who Lost Jobs Got New Ones, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
One United States steel town, Clairton, Pennsylvania, is so deeply in debt as a
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legislation.2 Economists are nearly unanimous in predicting a
devastating impact on the global economy if the trade barrier 3
legislation currently before the United States Congress is en-
acted.4 Implementation of an industrial policy5 based on selec-
tive relaxation of the enforcement of United States antitrust
result of the closing of the local United States Steel Corporation plant that it has
discharged its entire police force and fire department. Gruson, Steel Towns Discharge
Police and Reduce Services Sharply, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1985, at Al, col. 1. Charles W.
Bartsch, a policy analyst for the Northeast-Midwest Institute, a Washington-based
economic and environmental research center, predicts that many industrial towns
will go into bankruptcy as a result of foreign competition. Id. This economic decline
is not temporary. See Prokesch, Another Decline in Wage Increases Expected in 1986, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 21, 1985, at AI, col. 1; Business Economists See a Sluggish '86, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 12, 1985, at 39, col. 3. Lester Thurow, professor of economics and management
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, warns that a full-scale depression is a
possibility. Thurow, The 20's and 30's Can Happen Again, N.Y. Times,Jan. 22, 1986, at
A23, col. 3.
In the 1980's international debt and not the stock market is apt to be the
hammer that shatters a fragile financial system. This country entered 1986
with $100 billion in international debt, borrowing $150 billion a year to fi-
nance its trade deficit ... [b]y 1989, America will owe more than $600 bil-
lion to the rest of the world and have to pay more than $60 billion in interest
payments ....
Id.
2. See, e.g., Weinraub, White House Maps Bill to Stem Tide of Protectionism, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 12, 1985, at Al, col. 1. Approximately 300 bills designed to protect
United States markets from imports are currently pending in Congress. Id. Presi-
dent Reagan has characterized the current level of protectionism as a "stampede."
Boyd, President Urges U.S. Lawmakers to Block Protectionist 'Stampede, ' N.Y. Times, Sept.
18, 1985, at Al, col. 3.
3. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
4. See Kristof, 'New Wave' View of Protectionism, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1985, at DI,
col. 1. "[A]lmost all economists remain aloof from the swelling political movement
to curb imports," id., and even those who do not condemn protectionist measures in
every situation "remain loath to be seen as granting a seal of approval to Capitol
Hill's broad calls for protectionism." Id. One economist has asserted that the sup-
port for protectionist legislation is "without any intellectual foundation at all." Id.
(quoting Paul R. Krugman, professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology). Duck Woo Nam, a leading economist in South Korea, predicts severe
effects on the world economy if protectionist legislation succeeds in the United States
Congress. Silk, A Confident South Korean, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1985, at D2, col. 1. Fi-
nally, many authorities doubt that protectionist measures would be a successful
method of protecting the United States economy. Franco Modigliani, the 1985
Nobel Prize winner in economics, has stated that "protectionism might prove ineffec-
tive-leading to higher interest rates and a higher dollar." Modigliani, A Message for
Reagan: And Why The Deficit Must Be Slashed, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1985, § 3, at 3, col. 1.
Four leading economists, Robert Crandall of the Brookings Institution, Herbert
Stein of the American Enterprise Institute, Edward Hudgins of the Heritage Founda-
tion, and William Niskanen of the Cato Institute, recently issued a joint statement to
the effect that protectionist legislation will not eliminate the trade deficit, but could
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laws 6 may, however, be a viable alternative. The Federal Trade
Commission 7 (FTC or the Commission) recently settled' a
trigger retaliatory restrictions and "increase international tensions." Protectionism is
Criticized, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1985, at D8, col. 6.
5. Generally, industrial policy is intervention in the private business sector by
the central government to "promote vigorous industrial growth." Schultze, Industrial
Policy: A Dissent, Brookings Review, Fall 1983, at 3, 4; see infra notes 119-24.
6. This Note advocates more than an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The
Federal Trade Commission [hereinafter referred to as the FTC or Commission],
under this proposal, would not only choose which ventures to prosecute, but would
also selectively allow international joint ventures to proceed after modification. Be-
cause this proposal does not involve prosecutorial discretion, but, rather, industrial
policy making, joint ventures approved by the FTC under this proposal would not be
subject to private antitrust actions.
Private plaintiffs brought 1,100 antitrust suits in 1984, largely because of the
allure of treble damages. "[T]he prospect of multiple recovery invites plaintiffs to
pursue doubtful claims." Greenhouse, Making Mergers Even Easier, N.Y. Times, Nov.
10, 1985, § 3, at 1, col. 2 (quoting Douglas H. Ginsburg, head of Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division).
7. The Federal Trade Commission Act established the FTC as an independent
administrative agency made up of five Presidentially-appointed commissioners. Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-70
(Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as the FTC Act or the Act]. Because "nothing ham-
pers business like uncertainty," Remarks of President Wilson, quoted in S. Rep. No. 597
63d Cong. 2d Sess. 6-7 (1914), the FTC was designed to "obviate the uncertainty of
the antitrust laws." 1 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, THE FTC AS AN ANTITRUST ENFORCE-
MENT AGENCY: THE ROLE OF SECTION 5 OF THE FTC ACT IN ANTITRUST 9 (Monograph
No. 5, 1981) [hereinafter cited as 1 ABA ANTITRUST MONOGRAPH]. The FTC com-
bines "adjudicatory, rule-making, fact-finding, advisory and reporting powers." 2
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, THE FTC AS AN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGENCY: ITS
STRUCTURES, POWERS AND PROCEDURES 1 (Monograph No. 5, 1981) [hereinafter cited
as 2 ABA ANTITRUST MONOGRAPH]. The FTC Act gave the Commission a broad grant
of power to take action against corporations engaged in" [u]nfair methods of compe-
tition." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)(2). The FTC enforces, inter alia, the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 46(c)-(d), and the FTC Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
The FTC's dual role as prosecutor and adjudicator also gives it flexibility in han-
dling antitrust cases. The Commission often acts as both prosecutor and judge in the
same case. See 1 ABA ANTITRUST MONOGRAPH, supra, at 1. The FTC has been criti-
cized for this dual role. See, e.g., Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1183, 1186-87 (1973) (criticizing a broad delegation of powers to, among
other agencies, the FTC). The basis of these criticisms is often that the Commission
cannot adjudicate proceedings impartially when it has already devoted significant ef-
fort to the proceeding's investigation and prosecution. See 2 ABA ANTITRUST MONO-
GRAPH, supra, at 67.
However, the FTC's "compartmentalization of functions" provides safeguards
against prejudicial handling. Id. at 68. Other safeguards include a "ban on ex parte
communications" once litigation is initiated, and the "substantial independence," id.,
of the administrative law judges of the FTC who perform the initial findings of fact.
Id. at 11. Most importantly, the dual function of the FTC gives it the flexibility man-
dated by Congress to "develo[p] ... special antitrust expertise and a uniform body of
law" not shared by the United States Department of Justice [hereinafter referred to
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as Justice Department]. Id. at 68. However, efforts to create a uniform body of law
are hampered by the FTC's own changing policies which must adapt to the changing
realities of the market, and judicial review by various circuit courts of appeal. Id.
Finally, the judiciary has sanctioned the dual function of the FTC. The Supreme
Court held that the FTC's dual role did not necessitate its disqualification. See FTC v.
Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 700-03 (1948). Lower courts have followed this pre-
cedent, finding no deprivation of due process when the Commission both investi-
gates and adjudicates a case. See, e.g., Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 1978-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 62,087 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978); FTC v. Cinderella
Career and Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (FTC
within its delegated power when it both investigates and decides to prosecute a case);
Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. FTC, 291 F. Supp. 628, 631 (E.D. Va. 1968) ("[b]oth
industry-wide investigations and adjudicative proceedings involving the same general
subject matter may be instituted and conducted simultaneously"), affidper curiam, 416
F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1969).
The FTC is also empowered to consider a wide range of factors in making deci-
sions. In 1972, the Supreme Court held, in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405
U.S. 233 (1972), that
legislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the Federal Trade
Commission does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in measuring a
practice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard of fair-
ness, it, like a court of equity, considers public values beyond simply those
enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 244.
The FTC's ability to consider a wide range of factors in making its decisions
makes it an ideal vehicle for the implementation of this industrial policy. See id. at
244-45 n.5. The Court in Sperry & Hutchinson noted that the FTC, in making its deci-
sion, may consider, inter alia, "whether the practice . . . offends public policy ...
whether.., it is ... oppressive ... whether it causes substantial injury to consum-
ers." Id. The Court explicitly recognized the Commission's authority to go outside
"the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws." Id. at 239; see also FTC v. Brown Shoe Co.,
384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966). "This broad power of the Commission is particularly well
established with regard to trade practices which conflict with the basic policies of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not actually violate these
laws." Id. (footnote omitted). The FTC's power is not, of course, without limit: "the
Commission may not have the authority to decide a case on the sole basis of social or
political considerations ... [but] non-economic values . .. are unquestionably rele-
vant and important considerations." Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Compe-
tition" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 282-83
(1980).
The FTC, unlike the judiciary, employs experts in its Bureau of Competition and
the Bureau of Economics. See 16 C.F.R. § 0.9 (1985). The Bureau of Competition
investigates antitrust violations and recommends action to the Commission. Id.
§ 0.16. The Bureau of Economics advises the Commission on economic matters. Id.
§ 0.18. Additionally, the FTC generally may be able to act more quickly than the
courts, see 2 ABA ANTITRUST MONOGRAPH, supra, at 20-22, and avoid the multiplicity
and uncertainty that the judiciary brings to deciding complex business matters. Id. at
20.
The FTC is also a more effective agency than Congress in administering an in-
dustrial policy, because Congress, in recent developments, has shown itself unwilling
or unable to either resist protectionist devices or pass legislation that will effectively
encourage United States industrial competitiveness. Shenefield, Competitiveness in the
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Global Economy-The Need for an End to Ideology, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 54 (1984) (noting
what seems to amount to a "Congressional inability" to refuse to impose tariffs). For
example, a small United States manufacturer, Harley-Davidson Motors, successfully
sought a broad tariff on all Japanese motorcycles. Id. When Congress has attempted
to foster United States industries' world competitiveness through specialized legisla-
tion, the results have been ineffective. The National Cooperative Research Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984), for example, provides that joint ven-
tures are not illegal per se, and that if reported to antitrust enforcement officials in
advance, cannot be subject to treble damages. However, joint ventures never have
been illegal per se, and the elimination of treble damages by itself is unlikely to en-
courage any business to participate in a joint venture. See Blechman, Use ofJoint Ven-
tures to Foster U.S. Competitiveness in International Markets, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 65, 66
(1984). "The evidence so far does not suggest that the twin enactments [the National
Cooperative Research Act incorporates the National Productivity and Innovation Act
and the Joint Research and Development Act] will provide a major spur to United
States exports or foreign joint ventures." Joelson, U.S. Antitrust Policy in International
Trade, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 349, 354 (B. Hawk ed.); accord Halverson,
Transnational Joint Ventures and Mergers Under U.S. Antitrust Law, in 1984 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 143 (B. Hawk ed.).
Because the jurisdictions of the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department overlap, each agency informs the other of incipient investigations in or-
der to avoid duplicative investigations. 16 CFR § 4.6. "It is the policy of the Com-
mission to cooperate with other governmental agencies to avoid unnecessary over-
lapping or duplication of regulatory functions." Id. The two agencies also share
similar enforcement policies. "[Als a practical matter, there is very little, if any, dif-
ference in the nature of the analysis of the two agencies." Glynn, Market Definition,
Mergers and Joint Ventures, Panel Discussion in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 249, 255.
In In re General Motors, 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984) (consent decree) [hereinafter
cited as GM-Toyota], the FTC notified the Justice Department of its investigation into
the GM-Toyota joint venture. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,108 (1984); see infra
note 51 (discussion of consent decree procedure). When there is no conflicting in-
vestigation, each agency grants clearance to the other's investigation summarily. See
2 ABA ANTITRUST MONOGRAPH, supra, at 16 n.52. This arrangement has been gener-
ally successful. See id. at 17. Although some commentators have criticized the clear-
ance system as time-consuming, id. at 19, it allows for more efficient use of the agen-
cies' resources and expertise. See id. at 18.
Although the Justice Department "operates chiefly as a litigator," J. VAN CISE,
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, 47-48 (4th rev'd ed. 1982), it may, like the FTC, enter
into consent decrees with defendants as a resolution to civil proceedings. See 1 J. VON
KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAwS AND TRADE REGULATION § 91.09[l] (1985). TheJustice
Department is the agency which usually sets the standards for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion among the two federal antitrust enforcement agencies. See,
e.g., 1984 Justice Department Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (June 29,
1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 Merger Guidelines] amending 1982 Justice Depart-
ment Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (June 30, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
1982 Merger Guidelines]. Of the two agencies, only the justice Department has ju-
risdiction to prosecute criminal antitrust violations. It is irrelevant which agency ad-
ministers the industrial policy suggested by this Note because the policies of the two
agencies are so similar. However, because the FTC was the agency which settled the
GM-Toyota joint venture, the FTC will be the focus of this Note.
8. Technically, the FTC did not "approve" the GM-Toyota joint venture, but
challenged its legality under United States antitrust laws, see GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at
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complaint challenging an international joint venture9 between
General Motors Corporation (GM) and Toyota Motor Corpo-
ration (Toyota)'0 that could significantly improve United
States industrial competitiveness in world markets. The FTC
decision in In re General Motors Corporation (GM-Toyota) already
374-81 (complaint issued by the FTC alleging antitrust violations by GM and Toyota)
[hereinafter cited as Complaint], and then settled the dispute, see id. at 382-86 (Deci-
sion and Order imposing restrictions on the joint venture) [hereinafter cited as Or-
der]; see infra note 51 (discussion of consent decree procedure).
9. The term "joint venture" can encompass almost any cooperative effort be-
tween two firms resulting in the creation of a separate entity. See Pitofsky,Joint Ven-
tures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1007 (1969). However, in order to receive special consideration under the anti-
trust laws, the venture must have some potential for realizing efficiencies, expanding
output, or both. Brunswick Co., 94 F.T.C. 1174, 1265 (1979), aff'd and modified sub
nom Yamaha v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 915 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Brunswick]. In general, ajoint venture is "an integration of oper-
ations likely to lead to the expansion of output." See Brodley,Joint Ventures and Anti-
trust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1523, 1525 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brodley,Joint
Ventures]. Because of the inherent social benefit associated with increased output,
joint ventures are typically analyzed under the "rule of reason." The rule of reason
requires analysis of "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied .... Board of
Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Under rule of reason
analysis, courts or antitrust enforcement agencies balance the anticompetitive aspects
of a venture against the procompetitive aspects. See Brodley, Joint Ventures, supra, at
1535. By contrast, the "per se rule," which is normally applied to cartels and merg-
ers, relies on pre-set standards based on market power percentages to determine the
legality of a prospective business arrangement. Id. The per se rule is used only when
the "nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate
study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality .... National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). Efficiencies
gained through combining assets are generally not a defense under a per se analysis.
See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). For this reason, the
scope of this Note does not extend to mergers under present law.
The GM-Toyota deal should be considered a joint venture for two reasons. See
GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 386 (statement of Chairman Miller) [hereinafter cited as
Miller statement]. First, GM and Toyota remain competitors in the vast percentage
of their output, as the joint venture represents only a small fraction of GM and
Toyota's total production. Id. Secondly, in order to revitalize United States indus-
tries through the relaxation of the antitrust laws concerning joint ventures, it is im-
portant to protect the ventures from the stricter per se analysis. But see id. at 394
(dissenting statement of Commissioner Bailey) [hereinafter cited as Bailey statement]
(because the circumstances of GM-Toyota are collusion-prone-"a collaboration be-
tween two major competitors resembles a partial merger more than a true joint ven-
ture"-a per se analysis might be more appropriate).
10. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 374.
1986] JOINT VENTURES AFTER GM-TOYOTA 263
has inspired similar" international production joint ven-
tures. 1
2
Part I of this Note will describe the evolution of United
States antitrust laws and their application to international joint
ventures.' 3 Part II of this Note will then demonstrate, through
an analysis of the GM-Toyota decision, that the FTC's settle-
ment of its proceeding against GM and Toyota embodies an
industrial policy.' 4 Part III will show that implementation of
an industrial policy through the antitrust laws is logical, neces-
sary, and, above all, preferable to protectionist legislation as a
means of stimulating United States industrial competitiveness
in world markets. 15 Finally, this Note will propose a program
of restrictions, similar to those imposed in GM-Toyota,'6
designed to maximize the procompetitive benefits of interna-
tional joint ventures.' 7
I. UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LA WAND
INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES
The purpose of the United States antitrust laws is the pro-
tection of a competitive marketplace.' 8 In protecting competi-
11. Cases similar to GM-Toyota include any potential international joint venture
between a United States parent from an industrial sector under intense foreign com-
petition and a foreign parent. See supra note 1 (including, inter alia, the textile, steel,
semiconductor, and footwear sectors).
12. See Holusha, Chrysler, Mitsubishi Pick Illinois Site, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at
Dl, col. 3. Chrysler Corporation [hereinafter referred to as Chrysler] and Mitsubishi
Motors Corporation have agreed to form an automobile production joint venture at a
site 100 miles southwest of Chicago. Id. The Ford Motor Company [hereinafter
referred to as Ford] and the Mazda Motor Company have announced the creation of
a similar venture to be based in Flat Rock, Michigan. Id. In addition, U.S. Steel
Corporation announced a joint venture with Pohang Iron and Steel Co. of South
Korea. Cuff, U.S. Steel in Korean Import Plan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1985, at D1, col. 6.
The two steel producers will spend U.S.$300 million to modernize U.S. Steel's plant
in Pittsburg, California. Id. Pohang is one of the world's most efficient steel-makers.
Id.
13. See infra notes 18-47 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 48-90 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 91-128 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 129-52 and accompanying text.
18. United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553-54
(1944); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). "Antitrust
laws in general . . . are the Magna Carta of free enterprise . . . [a]nd the freedom
guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete
.... Id.
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tion, antitrust enforcement has historically been responsive to
changes in the marketplace. 19 As markets become increasingly
global rather than national, 20 antitrust enforcement should re-
flect this change by formulating a new industrial policy 2'
designed to facilitate international joint ventures. 22
19. See McGrath, Views From the Justice Department-Enforcement Policy and Current
Issues in International Trade, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 264, 279 (B. Hawk ed.).
"Historically, antitrust laws were asked to serve a variety of economic, social and
political goals, most of which were not mentioned or even alluded to in the [antitrust]
statutes themselves." Id. at 279. The "true goal of antitrust enforcement" is now
perceived to be the "enhancement of economic efficiency" rather than "penalizing
corporations for mere size." Id. "[A]s we experienced double-digit inflation, rising
unemployment, and declines in productivity growth, the public became more inter-
ested in using antitrust to promote efficiency and economic growth, and less inter-
ested in using antitrust to advance ill-defined social concerns." Interview with James C.
Miller 111, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 8 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Miller Interview].
20. See, e.g., Alm, Free Trade Fight, U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 23, 1985, at
50. Automobile imports accounted for 23% of the United States market in 1984. Id.;
see McGrath, supra note 19, at 270. Foreign trade has
expanded almost geometrically during the past decade, and our economy's
interdependence with our trading partners has increased apace. This has
forced a critical reevaluation of all aspects of our economic system, espe-
cially since mounting trade deficits have caused a national concern about
our ability to compete, as well as a recognition that we no longer can ignore
other nations in deciding the terms on which we will compete internation-
ally.
Id.
21. See Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). The
antitrust laws themselves are an industrial policy, embodying governmental restric-
tions regulating the behavior of private industry. Id.
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competi-
tive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the low-
est prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at
the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of
our democratic, political and social institutions. But even were that premise
open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competi-
tion.
Id.
22. See infra note 36 (discussion of antitrust impacts of joint ventures). Joint
ventures can harm competition by presenting the opportunity for collusion between
the venturers, loss of potential competition between former competitors, and market
exclusion. Brodley,Joint Ventures, supra note 9, at 1530. Collusion involves the ex-
change of competitively sensitive information for the benefit of the parties involved.
See, e.g., GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 395-96 (Bailey statement). Loss of potential com-
petition results when a parent that was a potential market entrant on its own instead
becomes a party to the joint venture. See Pitofsky, supra note 9, at 1013. However,
the potential loss of competition of a parent is often offset by the market entry of the
joint venture itself, which has the further benefit of being an actual and immediate
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A. United States Antitrust Law
During the nineteenth century, courts applied state com-
mon law to condemn businesses that restrained trade unrea-
sonably or engaged in monopolistic practices. 23 As the United
States became increasingly industrial, the common law anti-
trust standards provided insufficient deterrence against an-
ticompetitive business practices.2 4  Federal antitrust statutes
were required to combat the anticompetitive practices made
possible by the growth of industry.25
The Sherman Act26 represented an early attempt by Con-
gress to prohibit anticompetitive business combinations.27 The
broad language of the Sherman Act, covering a wide range of
unfair practices, 28 made it difficult to enforce 29 and led to the
entry rather than a speculative entry. Brodley, joint Ventures, supra note 9, at 1532.
Additionally, establishing that a firm is a potential entrant is, in itself, very difficult.
Id. at 1537. Finally, a joint venture can exclude competition from the market by re-
stricting the other firm's access to materials essential to carrying on business, but this
type of anticompetitive behavior usually occurs only with marketing or input supply
joint ventures. Id.
A horizontal joint venture is one formed in the market in which the parents al-
ready compete. Pitofsky, supra note 9, at 1035-36. Traditionally, horizontal joint
ventures in a concentrated market, such as the GM-Toyota venture, see GM-Toyota,
103 F.T.C. at 375, have received the highest level of scrutiny from antitrust enforc-
ers, see Brodley,Joint Ventures, supra note 9, at 1552-53, especially when the parents
are competitors with large market shares. Id.
23. 1 J. VON KALINOWSKi, supra note 7, at § 1.01. This practice was justified on
the basis of the need to protect fair competition and public welfare. Id. at § 1.01[2];
see also P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw 44 (3d ed. 1981).
24. 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 7, at § 1.0214].
25. Id. Interstate conglomerates could not be checked effectively by state laws.
See id.
26. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890). Section one of the Sherman Act prohib-
its "[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations
.... " Id. Section two forbids any person to form a monopoly, "or attempt to monop-
olize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." 15
U.S.C. § 2. "Person" includes all corporations and associations. 15 U.S.C. § 7.
27. 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 7, at § 2.02[4].
28. J. VAN CISE, supra note 7, at 7; e.g., P. AREEDA, supra note 23, at 48. The
Sherman Act prohibits ". . . monopolies and contracts, combinations and conspira-
cies in restraint of trade." Id.
29. 1 J. voN KALINOWSKI, supra note 7, at § 2.03[l]. The laissez-faire theory of
economics that was in vogue at the turn of the century also reduced the demand for
strict antitrust enforcement. Id. § 2.03[l][a]; cf P. AREEDA, supra note 23, at 53-61
(procedures for enforcing the antitrust laws).
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passage of the Clayton3 0 and Federal Trade Commission Acts
(FTC Act). 3 These two Acts formed the statutory basis for the
FTC's complaint against GM and Toyota.32 The FTC alleged
violation of section seven of the Clayton Act3 3 and section five
of the FTC Act.3 4
B. International Joint Ventures Under United States Antitrust Law
International joint ventures with one foreign and one do-
mestic parent, like the GM-Toyota joint venture,3 5 raise ques-
tions beyond those posed by purely domestic joint ventures,3 6
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18; see 1J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra
note 7, at § 205[l], [3]. Major amendments to the Clayton Act include the Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1936) (revising § 2 of the Clayton Act against price dis-
crimination), the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950) (revising
§ 7 of the Clayton Act), the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15
U.S.C. § 57a (1976) (adding notification requirements, allowing State attorneys gen-
eral to bring suit on behalf of any person injured, and allowing recovery of attorney's
fees by prevailing plaintiff), and the Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980,
15 U.S.C. § 18A (making procedural and jurisdictional modifications of the Clayton
Act).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-64; see 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI,
supra note 7, at § 203[l], [3]. The original powers of the FTC have been augmented
on three occasions: the Wheeler-Lea Amendments, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52-55 (1938);
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 591-
92 (1973); and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ment Act, Title II, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193 (1975). The FTC's power was
restricted by the Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980), which provides, inter alia, for Congressional oversight
hearings, restricts the time in which the FTC must act, and limits public disclosure by
the FTC.
32. GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 374 (Complaint).
33. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45. Sec-
tion seven states, in relevant part, that no company may acquire "the whole or any
part of the stock or ... assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acqui-
sition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
15 U.S.C. § 18. The term "person" includes all corporations and associations. 15
U.S.C. § 8.
34. Section 5 of the FTC Act states in relevant part that "[u]nfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45. For a more detailed
discussion of the FTC Act, see supra note 7; GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 374 (Com-
plaint).
35. See infra note 54 (description of the GM-Toyota cooperation).
36. Brodley,Joint Ventures, supra note 9, at 1554. "Horizontal joint ventures raise
such serious collusive risk that prohibition, rather than [restriction] is normally the
appropriate remedy." Id. In the past, antitrust analysis of joint ventures centered
around potential entrants and market power. See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin
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although certain international antitrust issues, such as extrater-
Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); Brunswick, 657 F.2d at 973-75. Both continue to
be elusive concepts.
Identifying a potential entrant is always speculative. See Brodley, Joint Ventures,
supra note 9, at 1527. Methods of measurement of market power continue to be
debated, and are beyond the scope of this Note. Compare Landes & Posner, Market
Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (1981) (calculating market power
by measuring a firm's elasticity of demand) with, e.g., Brennan, Mistaken Elasticities and
Misleading Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1850 (1982) (elasticity of demand model
does not take transportation costs into consideration); Kaplow, The Accuracy of Tradi-
tional Market Power Analysis and a Direct Adjustment Alternative, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1817,
1818 (1982) (Landes and Posner neglect to consider all social costs and incorrectly
define the markets involved); Schmalensee, Another Look at Market Power, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 1789 (1985) (the Landes and Posner analysis is limited by the market model
employed). It is interesting, however, that although the FTC made traditional mar-
ket power studies in the GM-Toyota decision, it largely discounted the results. GM-
Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 393-94 (Bailey statement). Obviously, a decision allowing a
joint venture between the first and third largest firms, id. at 393, in a highly concen-
trated market, evidences a change in the emphasis given to traditional market power
analysis.
The joint venture case most often compared with GM-Toyota is Brunswick, which
involved a proposed joint venture in the highly concentrated United States outboard
engine market between Brunswick, a United States outboard engine retailer, and
Yamaha, a Japanese outboard engine producer. Brunswick, 657 F.2d at 973-75. The
venture was prohibited after consideration of market power and loss of potential
competition. Id. However, the factual differences between Brunswick and GM-Toyota
make the comparison less than demonstrative. The Brunswick joint venture agree-
ment included highly questionable collateral agreements regarding division of for-
eign markets. Id. at 981. A collateral restraint is any anticompetitive restriction aris-
ing from an agreement not central to the operation of the joint venture. See Brodley,
Joint Ventures, supra note 9, at 1543. Yamaha was not present in the United States
outboard engine market in any capacity, although it was a strong competitor in the
motorcycle market. Brunswick, 657 F.2d at 978. Toyota has been a United States
retailer for several years. Yamaha was positively identified as a potential entrant from
two earlier, unsuccessful entry attempts. Id. It was only speculation that Toyota
would have begun United States production were it not for the GM-Toyota venture.
See Brodley, Joint Ventures, supra note 9, at 1527. But see Beauchamp, Close the door,
they're coming in the windows, Forbes, Jan. 21, 1986, at 82, 84 (Toyota has begun con-
struction of a U.S.$800 million plant in Kentucky, scheduled to be finished in mid-
1988).
A better perspective of pre-GM-Toyota antitrust enforcement regarding joint ven-
tures is gained from a brief examination of the evolution of the Justice Department's
Merger Guidelines. The Merger Guidelines were issued in 1968 and revised in 1982
and 1984. See supra note 7. The 1968 guidelines "reflected misplaced theories of the
day." McGrath, supra note 19, at 279 n.16. These theories centered around the con-
cept that business should be challenged primarily on the basis of size. Id.
The 1982 guidelines represented "a rather cautious approach" towards the use
of efficiencies as an antitrust defense. Interview with J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 27 (1984). This approach entailed a lim-
ited consideration of efficiencies only in close cases. Id. The 1982 guide did not
account for international competition in any significant fashion. See Baker, Market
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ritorial application of United States law,37 are not relevant to a
joint venture based in the United States.3 8 However, consider-
ation of the effects of trade barriers,39 the advantages enjoyed
by foreign competitors that are not subject to strict antitrust
laws,40 and the global nature of the automobile market,4 ' is
pertinent to an analysis of domestically-based international
joint ventures.
Commentators have attributed some of the recent indus-
trial success of Japan to the Japanese Government's interven-
Definition in Transnational Joint Ventures, Mergers and Monopolization, in 1984 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 115, 121 (B. Hawk ed.).
The 1984 guidelines recognize operational and managerial efficiencies as well as
the impact of foreign competition. McGrath, supra note 19, at 279 n.160. Commen-
tators have questioned whether the 1984 Merger Guidelines represent an increase in
certainty of treatment for international ventures. See Axinn, Greene & Denis, Import-
ing Foreign Competition Into American Antitrust Analysis-Is This The "New Learning., " in
1984 FORDAM CORP. L. INST., 191, 204 (B. Hawk ed.). Such commentators observe
that the 1984 Merger Guidelines "give the appearance of greater certainty" but are
"more ad hoc." Id.
37. For a discussion of the problems involved with extraterritorial antitrust en-
forcement, see McGrath, supra note 16, at 269-81; Joelson, supra note 7, at 349-57;
Halverson, supra note 7, at 143-56.
38. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 377. Production is to take place in Fremont,
California. Id.
39. For a more detailed discussion of trade barriers, see infra notes 96-101 and
accompanying text. The viability of United States automobile manufacturers has
been closely tied to a Voluntary Restraint Agreement (VRA) by the Japanese govern-
ment limiting the number ofJapanese automobiles imported into the United States.
See Japan Still Weighing Auto Curbs, N.Y. Times,Jan. 13, 1986, at Dl, col. 3; infra notes
45, 47. VRA's are negotiated and entered into solely by the President of the United
States and the particular foreign government involved. See Note, Protecting Steel: Time
for a New Approach, 96 HARV. L. REV. 866, 878 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Pro-
tecting Steel]. These agreements are not voluntary for individual Japanese businesses,
which must comply with their government's agreement. See Note, International Joint
Ventures in the United States: The GM-Toyota Deal, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 505, 508
(1984) (a VRA "acts like a quota") [hereinafter cited as Note, International Joint Ven-
tures].
In 1981, theJapanese government agreed to a VRA limiting their exports to 1.68
million cars per year. Japan to Limit Its U.S. Imports at 1,850,000 Cars, Wall St.J., Nov.
1, 1983, at 3, col. 4. In 1983, the VRA was set at 1.85 million cars per year. Id.
Japanese officials have not yet decided whether to extend the restraints on automo-
bile exports for the fiscal year 1986, which begins April 1. See Japan Still Weighing Auto
Curbs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1986, at D1, col. 3. For a discussion of the authority of
the executive to negotiate VRA's, see Note, Protecting Steel, supra, at 878-82.
40. See infra note 127 and accompanying text (foreign governments often pro-
mote the international competitiveness of their industries).
41. See, e.g., Note, The GM- Toyota Joint Venture: Legal Cooperation or Illegal Combina-
tion in the WorldAutomobile Industry?, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 699, 701-05 (1984); see also supra
notes 1, 20 and accompanying text.
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tion in that nation's industrial sector.42 The Japanese Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has received con-
siderable publicity4 3 as the agency responsible for the coordi-
nation of Japan's international trade efforts.4 4
United States automobile manufacturers are subject to the
pressures of a world market and strong international competi-
tion.4" United States automobile production, as a percentage
42. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 1, at 107; Schultze, supra note 5, at 4.
43. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 1, at 107; Schultze, supra note 5, at 4.
44. Schultze, supra note 5, at 4. Although commentators debate the extent of
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry's (MITI) control over Japan's econ-
omy, compare id. at 6 ("the contributions of MITI and of industrial policy to Japan's
postwar success have been far overstated") with Lundine, Now Is the Time For a Na-
tional Industrial Strategy, Challenge, July-Aug. 1983, at 16-17 (advocating legislation
creating an Economic Cooperation Council, which would function much like MITI,
to "revitalize" United States industry), it is clear that antitrust citations against com-
panies MITI deems important to Japan's economy are unusual. See Note, Trustbusting
in Japan: Cartels and Government-Business Cooperation, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1064, 1076-77
(1981).
The Japanese Antimonopoly Act, Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi torihiki no
Kakuho ni Kansuru horitsu [Law Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopolies
and the Maintenance of Fair Trade], Law. No. 54 of 1947, translated in 2 EIBUN-
Horei-Sha Bulletin Series KA, which is the empowering legislation for Japan's anti-
trust enforcement agency, the Fair Trade Commission, was created by United States
occupation authorities to be similar to United States antitrust laws. See Note, supra, at
1065-66. However the Fair Trade Commission was without much political power,
and the Antimonopoly Act was relaxed one year after occupation ended. Id. at 1066-
68.
From the 1950's to the 1970's, MITI fostered Japan's planned economic growth,
using penalties when necessary to force business to cooperate with its strategies. Id.
at 1067, 1072. Although the Fair Trade Commission has brought a small number of
successful antitrust enforcement actions in Japanese courts, its impact on the power
of MITI over Japanese industry appears to be insignificant, and MITI is still author-
ized to instruct businesses on an individual basis. Id. at 1077, 1079. In addition, the
Fair Trade Commission recently announced new policies designed to aid Japanese
industry. See 48 ANrITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 40 (Jan. 3, 1985). The Fair
Trade Commission stated that it would work towards establishing "appropriate com-
petitive conditions in industries that have fallen into structural depression" and "pre-
serve and promote vitality of the private sector and increase economic efficiency." Id.
In any event, Japan practices industrial policy at a level of coordination well above
that of the United States. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
45. See Hawk, International Antitrust Policy and the 1982 Acts: The Continuing Need for
Reassessment, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 206 (1982). Automobile imports for 1984
were valued at U.S.$29.4 billion and accounted for 23% of the United States market.
See Alm, Free-Trade Fight, U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 23, 1985, at 50. Although
United States automobile makers enjoyed a very successful third quarter in 1985, this
success was attributed to special low interest rate financing. Quint, Economy Gives
Alternating Signals, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1985, at DI, col. 3. "[Automobile] sales are
still very weak and we expect that to continue to be the case until the automobile
manufacturers come back with some kind of sales incentives." Auto Sales Down 14. 1,%
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of the world market, has dropped from seventy-five to less than
twenty-five percent since 1950.46 In 1980, for the first time,
another country, Japan, produced more passenger cars than
did the United States.4 7 In order to preserve a viable automo-
bile industry in the United States, and to protectjobs in related
sectors of the economy, industrial policy may be the best solu-
tion.
II. THE GM-TOYOTA CONSENT DECREE: AN
APPLICATION OF AN INDUSTRIAL POLICY
"Industrial policy" has various meanings, 48 and can be im-
plemented in several ways. 49 Basic to any type of industrial
policy, however, is intervention by the central government to
"promote vigorous industrial growth" in a faltering industrial
sector.50
A. The GM-Toyota Consent Decree
In a consent decree dated April 11, 1984,11 the FTC gave
In the Oct. 21-31 Period, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1985, at DI, col. 1. General Motors
began a new round of financing late in February, 1986. New Incentive Plan Offered by
G.M., N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1986, at D5, col. 5. Chrysler and Ford quickly followed
suit. Chrysler and Ford Offering Incentives, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1986, at D3, col. 5.
46. See Note, supra note 41, at 701 n.10.
47. Id. Toyota is now the third largest car manufacturer in the world behind GM
and Ford Motor Co., surpassing Chrysler. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 393-94 (Bai-
ley statement); 2 INT'L LEGAL BULL. 1 (West ed., Spring 1984). Because of this for-
eign competition, and the U.S.$2,000 per car cost advantage enjoyed by the Japa-
nese, GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 397 (Bailey statement), it is difficult to produce a
small car profitably in the United States. See Big 3's Car Sales Up 16. 77, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 5, 1983, at D1, col. 2. International joint ventures such as the GM-Toyota ar-
rangement may be the only way to maintain small car production in the United
States.
48. See Schultze, supra note 5, at 3.
49. See id. at 4. Examples of industrial policies are support for education, subsi-
dies for research and development, tax breaks, loans, and trade barriers. Id.; see infra
note 104.
50. See Schultze, supra note 5, at 3-4; supra note 5.
51. On December 22, 1983, the FTC provisionally accepted a consent agree-
ment concerning the proposed joint venture between GM and Toyota. See GM-
Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 386 (Miller statement). The consent decree was finalized after a
sixty-day period left open for public comment. Id. at 382; see 16 CFR § 3.25(f). The
FTC's procedure in settling consent decrees is to first publish the agreement as pre-
liminarily accepted. 16 CFR § 3.25(f). Then for a period of sixty days "the Commis-
sion will receive and consider any comments or views concerning the order that may
be filed by any interested person." Id. After that period the FTC "may either with-
draw its acceptance of the agreement . . . or take other action as it may consider
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final approval to the proposed settlement of its complaint
against the GM-Toyota joint venture by a vote of three to
two.5 2  The goal of the venture is the joint production of
automobiles at GM's idle plant in Fremont, California.53 The
joint venture vehicle is closely modeled after the Toyota Co-
rolla and the plant uses Japanese management and manufac-
turing techniques."4
appropriate, or issue and serve its decision in disposition of the proceeding." Id.
During the period for public comment in GM-Toyota, the Commission received
"[o]ver one hundred comments" but "none of these comments raised any significant
new facts or substantive arguments." Id. at 386 (Miller statement). The venture was
challenged in the District Court for the District of Washington, D.C., by Chrysler.
Chrysler Brings GM-Toyota Suit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1984, at D3, col. 1.
52. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 386-99.
53. See id. at 377. Fremont is the site of a former GM assembly facility that is to
be converted for the venture's use. Id.
54. See id. at 376-81. On February 17, 1983, GM and Toyota executed a Memo-
randum of Understanding outlining, in detail, the form that the joint venture was to
take. Id. The two companies agreed to jointly produce a vehicle "derived from
Toyota's new front-wheel drive Sprinter." Work was to begin "as early as possible in
the 1985 Model Year" at GM's unused plant in Fremont, California. Id. at 377
(Memorandum of Understanding). Toyota and GM would each hold a 50% equity
interest in the joint venture and each would appoint half of the board of directors.
Id. at 379. Toyota would designate the president of the joint venture, who would
function as both chief executive and operating officer. See id. Toyota would design
and oversee the refitting of the Fremont plant. See id. at 377. The joint venture must
sell the new GM-specific automobiles it produces to GM, although the joint venture
may manufacture or sell to Toyota any "additional products." Id. at 383-84.
One of the most controversial aspects of the joint venture agreement is the
transfer of competitively sensitive information, particularly price data, between the
two companies. See id. at 395 (Bailey statement); id. at 390 (dissenting statement of
Commissioner Pertschuk) [hereinafter cited as Pertschuk statement]. The Memoran-
dum of Understanding emphasizes the parents' isolation from the joint venture.
"The agreements reached between the parties relate only to the manufacturing [ven-
ture] described [in the agreement] and do not establish any special relationship be-
tween Toyota and GM who continue to be competitors in the United States and
throughout the world." Id. at 380 (Memorandum of Understanding). All "GM-spe-
cific vehicles" produced by the joint venture would be sold to GM to be marketed
solely by GM. Id. at 378 (Memorandum of Understanding). Any other vehicles that
might be produced for Toyota would be marketed exclusively by Toyota. Id. "As a
fundamental principle, Toyota and GM shall each be free to price and free to market
the respective vehicles purchased from the joint venture without restrictions or influ-
ence from the other." Id. at 379.
The price of the joint venture vehicle would be set in negotiations between GM
and the joint venture and based initially on a "Market Basket Index" Id. at 381 [here-
inafter referred to as the Index]. The "Market Basket" is comprised of the ten best
selling subcompacts based on volume sold in the United States. Id. Of the top ten,
two are GM cars and one is the Toyota Corolla. Id. The Index would be "the
weighted average rate of wholesale price fluctuations of the models from the prior
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The FTC imposed several restrictions on the venture in an
attempt to minimize antitrust problems identified in a com-
plaint drafted by the Bureau of Competition. 5 The complaint
noted that both the relevant product and geographic markets
are highly concentrated, 56 and that GM and Toyota are "sub-
stantial competitors in the relevant ... markets. ' 57 The com-
plaint could have noted additional anticompetitive obstacles to
the venture. For example, barriers to entry in the North Amer-
ican automobile manufacturing market are very high.58 In
addition, the joint venture would decrease the likelihood
model year to the current year, weighting Corolla at 30% versus 70% for all other
comparable models combined .... Id.
The initial selling price (the price of the first year's production) must conform to
an upper limit "determined by adjusting for feature differences the Dealer Net Price
less 8% of Toyota's then current U.S. model front-wheel drive Corolla equipped
comparably with the (joint venture] vehicle concerned, and the lower limit shall be
determined by adjusting for feature differences the Dealer Net Price less 11% of said
Corolla." Id. at 378. In subsequent years the vehicle's price will be set by applying
the Index to the selling price for the previous model year. Id.
If at any time this formula fails to yield a satisfactory price, or produces "a selling
price which is at significant variance with then current market conditions," GM and
the joint venture will "negotiate a more appropriate selling price." Id. Additionally,
if the pricing formula would cause prices to be set at a level that would cause the joint
venture to operate at a loss, "Toyota, GM and the (joint venture] shall negotiate and
take necessary measures." Id. at 378-79.
55. See supra note 7 (discussion of Bureau of Competition); GM-Toyota, 103
F.T.C. at 374-76 (Complaint). The Complaint specified as potentially anticompeti-
tive areas expansion of the capacity of the joint venture beyond what was "reasonably
necessary" to achieve the venture's legitimate goals and the opportunity for "trans-
mission of competitively significant information." Id. at 376. The Complaint alleged
that "[t]he effect of the []oint [vienture may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in the relevant markets in violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. § 45)." Id.
56. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 375. The "relevant product market" for the
joint venture is identified as the manufacture or sale of small new automobiles. Id.
The "relevant geographic market" is the United States and Canada. Id. The relevant
market includes "those suppliers-of the same or related product in the same or
related geographic area-whose existence significantly restrains [the] power [of an-
other firm in the relevant market to raise prices]." P. AREEDA, supra note 23, at 231.
A highly concentrated, or oligopolistic, market is one where a small number of firms
dominate the economic performance of a market and collectively may exert monopo-
listic power. Id. 260.
57. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 375; see also supra note 56.
58. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 393 (Bailey statement). "Entry barriers to this
market are obviously quite high .... ." Id. Barriers to entry deny new firms the
chance to penetrate and compete in a particular market. P. AREEDA, supra note 23, at
117. Entry barriers to the automobile industry consist primarily of the large econo-
mies of scale necessary to produce automobiles efficiently enough to make a profit
and the correspondingly enormous capital requirements. Id.
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of Toyota becoming a North American producer of automo-
biles. 59
B. Industrial Policy Basis of GM-Toyota
Analysis of the GM-Toyota consent decree 60 reveals that it
is based on reasoning outside the traditional bases of antitrust
enforcement 6' and heralds the arrival of a new international
consideration in antitrust enforcement. This new considera-
tion, as noted by several commentators, is a federal concern
for industries floundering under intense foreign competi-
tion.6 2 The consent decree itself plainly acknowledges this
consideration. 63  Commissioners approving the GM-Toyota
venture noted the venture's potential to "lead to the develop-
59. See supra note 36 (discussion of Toyota as production entrant). Toyota has
been a retailer in the United States for several years, but at the time of the GM-Toyota
decision had no manufacturing facilities in the United States. See GM-Toyota, 103
F.T.C. at 393 (Bailey statement). By comparison, Japanese car manufacturers Honda
and Nissan have initiated United States-based manufacturing. Id.
60. See supra notes 7, 51 (discussion of consent decrees).
61. See supra notes 9, 22, 36 (discussion of traditional antitrust concerns).
62. See, e.g., Brodley, The Limited Scope and Precedential Value of the FTC's GM-Toyota
Decision in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INsT. 223 (B. Hawk ed.) [hereinafter cited as
Brodley, Limited Scope]; see infra note 104.
63. GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 388 (Miller statement). The majority of the FTC
expressly indicated the importance of the GM-Toyota joint venture for United States
industrial competitiveness. Id. The dissenting Commissioners attacked the deci-
sion's policy basis. Id. at 389 (Pertschuk statement). Commissioner Pertschuk dis-
paraged the decision's obvious "national policy" basis in criticizing the Bureau of
Competition for citing evasion of the VRA as a procompetitive benefit. Id.; see Gen-
eral Motors Corp. and Toyota Motor Corp.: Proposed Consent Agreement With
Analysis To Aid Public Comment, 48 Fed. Reg. 57,246, 57,252 (Pertschuk statement)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Consent Agreement] (GM-Toyota is an "unacceptable
exercise in second-guessing other national policies").
Commissioner Bailey stated that the question before the Commission was
"whether a joint venture such as that proposed by these companies is sanctioned by
the nation's antitrust laws ... [w]hether it should be is not for me to say. That argu-
ment should be posed in another forum." GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 392 (Bailey
statement) (emphasis in original). One antitrust scholar argues that promoting the
United States' world market competitiveness is an "unsuitable legal standard for ad-
judication." Brodley, Limited Scope, supra note 62, at 224, 227-31.
Although the policy considerations objected to in these criticisms may be beyond
the proper scope of the judicial review, they are not beyond the competency of the
FTC. See United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963).
"[T]he reckoning of social or economic debits and credits.., is beyond the ordinary
limits ofjudicial competence, and in any event, has been [done] already, by Congress
.... " Id. This reckoning was made when Congress delegated broad powers to the
FTC. See generally FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-70.
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ment of a more efficient and competitive U.S. industry' 6 4 and
"strengthen the competitive posture of American automobile
manufacturers. '65  This type of intervention by the federal
government to aid a distressed industry is the essence of an
industrial policy.66
C. FTC Analysis of the GM-Toyota Joint Venture
The FTC identified two major anticompetitive problems
and three major procompetitive benefits likely to result from
the joint venture.6 7 The anticompetitive effects noted by the
Commission were that the venture could deter GM from con-
tinuing to produce other small cars, and that possibilities for
the collusive exchange of information would be inherent in the
venture.68 As procompetitive benefits, the FTC expected that
the joint venture would increase the overall volume of small
cars available to United States consumers, allow GM to build
the vehicle at the lowest possible cost, and give GM the oppor-
tunity to learn the more efficient Japanese manufacturing and
management techniques which would then disseminate
throughout United States industry.69
64. GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 388 (Miller statement).
65. Id. at 398 (statement of Commissioner Douglas) [hereinafter cited as Doug-
las statement]. The Commission's main goal was to boost United States industrial
competitveness, principally through the acquisition by GM of Japanese production
efficiencies. The relative weakness of the other two procompetitive benefits cited by
the majority is further evidence of the predominance of this goal. See Brodley, Limited
Scope, supra note 62, at 224-25. Benefits to consumers from an increased number or
choice of automobiles in the market are dubious, see GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 396
(Bailey statement), and are, in any event, limited by the restriction on output. Id. at
383; Brodley, Limited Scope, supra note 62, at 225. The output restriction also under-
cuts a second of the venture's procompetitive benefits, namely cost efficiency for GM,
see id. at 226, because the stated purpose of the restriction is to encourage GM to seek
alernative and necessarily more expensive small car sources. GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C.
at 387 (Miller statement).
66. See supra note 5.
67. See infra notes 68-69. The GM-Toyota decision was rendered "after one of
the most thorough and intensive antitrust reviews in Commission history." GM-
Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 386 (Miller statement).
68. The two potential anticompetitive effects were: 1) that the venture would
reduce "GM's incentives to continue alternative production of small cars," and 2) the
"possibility of anticompetitive information exchanges that are unnecessary to achieve
the legitimate purposes of the joint venture." Id. at 387 (Miller statement).
69. The procompetitive benefits cited by the majority were: 1) an increase in the
total volume of small cars available in the United States, which would provide United
States consumers with a "greater choice at lower prices, despite present restrictions
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D. Restrictions Designed by the FTC to Minimize the
Anticompetitive Effects of the Joint Venture
The GM-Toyota settlement was conditioned on the imposi-
tion of several restrictions. 70 These restrictions were designed
to ensure the venture's minimum anticompetitive effects on
the marketplace while maintaining the venture's maximum
procompetitive benefits.71
In order to maintain GM's incentive to build small cars
independently of the joint venture, the FTC limited the output
and duration of the venture.72 The Commission also set forth
detailed regulations concerning the type of information that
on Japanese imports," 2) that the joint venture would be able to build the new car at
lower cost "than if GM were forced to rely immediately on some other production
source," and 3) "the joint venture offers a valuable opportunity for GM to complete
its learning of more efficient Japanese manufacturing and management techniques."
Id. at 387-88. Commentators have viewed the learning efficiencies as the most signif-
icant factor in the Commission's decision. See, e.g., Brodley, Limited Scope, supra note
62, at 223; see supra note 65. The FTC projected that this learning benefit could be
extended throughout the automobile industry and eventually to other industries,
leading to a "more efficient and competitive U.S. industry." GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C.
at 388 (Miller statement). Having weighed the pro- and anticompetitive effects, the
Commission decided that, with FTC-imposed restrictions, the joint venture would be
decidedly procompetitive. See id. at 386-88.
70. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 386-87 (Miller statement); see infra notes 72-73,
75, 77.
71. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 386-87 (Miller statement).
72. Id. at 387. The venture is restricted to manufacturing no more than approx-
imately 250,000 new automobiles for GM, roughly the yearly production of one
"module." Id. at 383 (Order). A module is "an integrated manufacturing facility...
capable of producing not more than approximately 250,000 New Automobiles per
year." Id. This number does not include any vehicles made for Toyota. Id. at 383-
84. Additionally, the joint venture can be expanded with prior approval of the Com-
mission. Id. at 387 (Miller statement). The Commission failed to mention, however,
that in addition to the GM-Toyotajoint venture, GM plans to import small cars built
in Japan with Suzuki and Isuzu and has plans with Daewoo Motor Co., a 50% GM
owned corporation, for a comparable venture in South Korea. Note, The GM-Toyota
Joint Venture: Legal Cooperation or Illegal Combination in the World Automobile Industry, 19
TEx. INT'L L.J. 699, 705 (1984) (citing Bettner, 70 mpg. But Will It Sell?, Forbes, Feb.
13, 1984, at 82). Such foreign based ventures will not have the beneficial impact on
United States employment that a domestically based venture would.
The joint venture must not last for more than twelve years. See GM-Toyota, 103
F.T.C. at 384. After the twelve-year period, which may not extend beyond December
31, 1997, the joint venture may continue its existence in order to "win[d] up [its]
affairs," exclusive of manufacturing. Id.
The majority of the FTC stressed that these restrictions on the size and duration
of the venture guarantee that GM will compete in the small car market independently
of the joint venture. Id. at 387 (Miller statement). Chairman Miller stated that it was
"ensure[d]" GM will retain its incentive. Id.
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the parties may exchange. 73 However, the restrictions on com-
munications concerning the joint venture are voidable when
''necessary to accomplish . . . the legitimate functions" of the
joint venture."4 Finally, the FTC imposed detailed reporting
requirements on the joint venture and its parents.75
According to the majority of the FTC,7 6 prohibition of the
exchange of competitively sensitive information unnecessary
to the venture's functioning and establishment of strict report-
ing requirements guarantee that the joint venture will not re-
sult in collusion.77 These reporting requirements enable the
Commission to monitor the venture to detect any potential an-
titrust problems. 78 Limited by these restrictions, the joint ven-
ture provides significant benefits to competition and to United
States consumers without posing significant new anticompeti-
tive risks.79
73. See id. at 384 (Order). There is an absolute restriction on the communica-
tion of all marketing plans and non-public information concerning prices, costs, sales
and production forecasts relating to products other than that of the joint venture. Id.
This is a variety of Chinese Wall provision, forbidding discussion on certain topics.
See Brodley, Limited Scope, supra note 62, at 226. "Information is presumptively public
if it is reported in a publication other than one authored by GM or Toyota." Id. at
383 (emphasis in original). Additionally, GM and Toyota may not discuss between
themselves, or with the joint venture, non-public information concerning the joint
venture's model and design changes, sales or production forecasts, or the price of
supplies from GM or Toyota to the joint venture. Id. at 384.
74. Id. This escape clause has been criticized. See infra note 83 and accompany-
ing text.
75. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 385-86. All parties to the joint venture must
keep accurate records of their communications relating to model and design changes,
sales and production forecasts, and the cost of products supplied to the venture by
the parents. Id. at 385. These files must be made available to the FTC upon request
for six years. The parties must also periodically submit signed statements from man-
agers involved in the venture indicating their intention to comply with the Order, and
the companies themselves must periodically detail their compliance with the terms of
the Order. Id. at 385. Lastly, the FTC must be informed of any changes that affect
compliance. Id.
76. GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 385 (Miller statement). Chairman Miller stated
that it was "ensure[d]" that the venture would not result in collusion. Id. at 387.
Commissioner Calvani echoed Chairman Miller's confidence: "[l]imiting informa-
tion exchanges between the two companies . . . to communications necessary for
producing the joint venture vehicle closes the only potential channel for collusion
[remaining]." Id. at 399 (statement of Commissioner Calvani) [hereinafter cited as
Calvani statement].
77. See supra note 76; see also supra notes 22, 36 (discussion of collusion).
78. Id. at 387 (Miller statement).
79. Id. Concerns about the pricing formula, the possibility of collusion, and the
effect of the joint venture on Toyota's incentive to begin production in the United
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E. The Dissent Advocated Traditional Antitrust Enforcement
The two-dissenting Commissioners questioned the bene-
fits of the GM-Toyota joint venture to a competitive market-
place.80 Both Commissioners doubted the validity of the bene-
fits to the consumer," criticized the equality and effectiveness
of the potential learning efficiencies,82 and dismissed as futile
States do not amount to "significant antitrust dangers" after imposition of the re-
strictions. Id. But see infra notes 80-84 (objections of the dissenting Commissioners).
80. See id. at 388 (Pertschuk statement); id. at 392 (Bailey statement).
81. GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 387 (Miller statement). One procompetitive bene-
fit cited by the majority is a likely increase in the total number of automobiles avail-
able to consumers. Id. However, it must be noted that the FTC limited the output
potential of the venture. See id. at 383 (Order). Furthermore, GM itself predicts no
increase in industry output as a result of the joint venture, anticipating instead that
the sales of the joint venture car will correspondingly diminish the sale of GM and
Toyota vehicles. Id. at 396 (Bailey statement). The Bureau of Economics prepared a
report criticized by Commissioner Bailey for dismissing GM's "damaging admis-
sion." Id. The car to be produced by the joint venture will also not be a truly new
product providing consumers with an additional choice because it will closely copy
the Toyota Corolla. See id. at 393. The Bureau of Competition report to the Com-
missioners stated that any differences between the joint venture vehicle and the Co-
rolla would be "modest." Aside from cosmetics the two cars would be "essentially
identical." Id. (citing Bureau of Competition Staff Memo, I, 10). For an example of a
new product, see Broadcast Music v. Central Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 21-22
(1979). The product was described as "different" and having "certain unique charac-
teristics" with distinct appeal to consumers. Id.
Finally, the two dissenting Commissioners contended that any potential con-
sumer benefit could be achieved by GM in a joint venture with an alternative partner,
one smaller than Toyota. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 396 (Bailey statement); id. at
389 (Pertschuk statement). GM could have engaged in a joint venture with a smaller
Japanese automobile manufacturer and thereby considerably reduced the antitrust
risks posed by a cooperative venture between the first and third largest producers in
the market. See id. at 396 (Bailey statement). Because much of the early thrust of the
antitrust laws was directed at controlling, if not eliminating, huge companies with
tremendous market power most of the traditional antitrust concerns could be greatly
reduced by requiring GM to select a joint venture partner with a smaller market share
than Toyota. See supra note 36. Although it would be more expensive for GM, a joint
production venture with a smaller Japanese automobile manufacturer less efficient
than Toyota would closely match any benefits conferred on consumers by the GM-
Toyota joint venture. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 396-97. The Bureau of Competi-
tion prepared a report stating that a GM-Isuzujoint venture would hinder dissemina-
tion of learning efficiencies throughout the labor force because GM owns a large
share of Isuzu and the "UAW would likely perceive Isuzu as GM's 'alter ego' under
the labor laws, and be unwilling to grant significant concessions." Id. at 389-90 (Pert-
schuk statement) (citing a Bureau of Competition staff memo). This theory was criti-
cized by Commissioner Pertschuk as lacking evidentiary support and as "principally
speculation." Id. at 390. In any event, other Japanese small car manufacturers in
addition to Isuzu and Toyota could have participated in a joint venture with GM.
82. GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 387 (Miller statement). The FTC indicated and
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the majority's attempt to eliminate the possibility of collu-
most commentators agree that the most important of the anticipated benefits of the
GM-Toyota venture is GM's opportunity to learn more efficient Japanese manufac-
turing and management methods. See id. at 387-88; Brodley, Limited Scope, supra note
62, at 223, 225. "The primacy of the learning/demonstration effect rationale is ...
apparent." Id. It is the reasoning of the FTC that the acquisition of these learning
efficiencies by GM would eventually lead to the dissemination of this knowledge
throughout United States industry. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 388. This learning
or management efficiency would presumably allow United States automobile makers
to narrow the cost advantage reportedly enjoyed by the Japanese. See id. at 397.
However, this assumption raises serious questions. Learning or management effi-
ciencies cannot compensate for that 40% of the cost advantage that stems from the
difference between the cost of United States and Japanese labor. See id.
Some commentators argue that learning or managerial efficiencies should not be
given weight in antitrust analysis. See Clanton, Horizontal Agreements, The Rule of Rea-
son, and the General Motors-Toyota Joint Venture, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1239, 1261-64 (1984).
Management efficiencies are considered by some to be either unquantifiable or exis-
tent in every managerial change. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ArTITRUST LAw 936,
1108d; Fisher & Landes, Efficiencies, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580 (1983). The FTC has also
rejected managerial efficiencies in recent years. See FTC Statement Concerning Horizontal
Mergers, 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 546, at 181 n.20 (June 16, 1982); special
supplement at 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4225 (Aug. 9, 1982). But see Muris, The
Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 381 (1980).
Cooperation that benefits only one of the firms in the venture has been held to be
insufficient to justify anticompetitive effects. See General Cinema Corp. v. Buena
Vista Distribution Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1273-74 (C.D. Cal. 1982). However, Gen-
eral Cinema involved a clearly anticompetitive elimination of competitive price bid-
ding. Id. at 1258.
It is unclear that requisition of learning efficiencies will reverse the trade differ-
ential. Another source of the Japanese trade advantage is the current valuation of the
United States dollar against the Japanese yen, a condition that the joint venture will
not affect. See Samuelson, Where lacocca and Common Sense Err, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15,
1985, at D3, col. 1. In recognition of the significance of the dollar to world trade the
United States, Japan, Britain, West Germany and France agreed to join together to
reduce the dollar's value and have enjoyed limited success thus far. Kristoff, Dollar
Plunges to 16-Month Low in Reaction to 5 Nation's Accord, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1985, at
AI, col. 4; Dollar Declines Broadly To Hit a 20-Month Low, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1985, at
B44, col. 5. Late in 1985, the U.S. dollar had fallen "only 6.8 percent on average"
against the fifteen major currencies. Kilborn, How the Big Six Steer the Economy, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 17, 1985, § 3, at p. 1, col. 2. Early in 1986, the dollar fell to 194 yen.
Dollar at Lowest Level Against Yen in 7 Years, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1986, at D20, col. 5.
More recently, the dollar fell to 180 yen. Dollar in Broad Decline In Reaction to Rate Cuts,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1986, at D14, col. 5. Economists state that although the weaken-
ing of the dollar will help to reduce the trade deficit, "a much bigger drop is needed
to bring about a substantial adjustment." Farnsworth, Year's Trade Deficit Hit a Record
$148.5 Billion, N.Y. Times,Jan. 3, 1986, at Dl, col. 1; see also Silk, The Yen Also Rises,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1986, at D2, col. 1. The dollar has fallen 26.5% from its peak in
1985, but still must decline another 23.7% to reach its 1978 level. Silk, The Yen Also
Rises, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1986, at D2, col. 1. Lawrence B. Krause, a senior fellow at
the Brookings Institution, thinks that the dollar must go to 100 yen to achieve a trade
equilibrium. Id. John Williamson of the Institute of International Economics esti-
1986] JOINT VENTURES AFTER GM-TOYOTA 279
sion.8 3 In addition, one dissenting Commissioner argued that
mates that the United States trade deficit, which totaled U.S.$150 billion in 1985,
could be reduced below U.S.$50 billion if the dollar falls to 130 yen. Id. Edward M.
Bernstein, former research director of the International Monetary Fund, believes the
dollar must fall to 120 yen to reach equilibrium. Id.
However, according to Edward Yardeni, chief economist for Prudential-Bache
Securities, Inc., the deflation of the dollar is merely a temporary solution. See Subdo-
ing the Dollar, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1985, § 3, at 1, col. 1. Furthermore, the strength
of the dollar versus the yen is not perceived by all observers to be the primary cause
of the trade deficit. Karczmar, A Weaker Dollar Won't Slow Imports, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30,
1985, § 4, at 3, col. 1. "Even a significant drop in the dollar's value will not substan-
tially reduce the trade imbalance." Id.
Another factor cited as contributing to the trade deficit withJapan is the frugality
of the Japanese consumer. See Chira, Wealthy Japan's Spartan Style, N.Y. Times, Oct.
30, 1985, at Dl, col. 3; Come On, Japan, Live Better!, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1985, at A26,
col. 1.
The learning efficiencies gained have also been attacked as "highly speculative
... if they exist to any degree," GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 388 (Pertschuk statement),
because Toyota will manufacture most of the more complicated components of the
car outside of the United States, and because GM observers at the Fremont plant will
oversee only basic assembly procedures. Additionally, Toyota has the authority to
shift the joint venture's production to Japan. See id. at 380; 2 U.S. Units Possible For
Toyota, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1983, at D3, col. 4. Such a move would logically limit
GM's opportunity to learn through daily observation.
The potential for GM's attaining learning efficiencies through a joint venture
with Toyota might also be duplicated in a joint venture with an alternative partner,
one necessarily smaller than Toyota, just as a joint venture with an alternative part-
ner could closely duplicate the benefits to consumers. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at
389 (Perschuk statement). The majority of the FTC, in approving the project, relied
on a Bureau of Economics report that estimated a GM joint venture with Toyota
would be more beneficial for GM than a venture with a smaller Japanese automobile
maker. Id. This estimate is unsupported. The Bureau of Economics report "pro-
vides speculative estimates of the marginal gain from GM's joining hands with
Toyota, as opposed to Isuzu or others ... these estimates deserve the healthiest of
skepticism." Id. at 389. The majority's reasoning is illogical. If the benefits of a GM-
Toyota partnership are unique, then allowing GM, the leading firm in the industry,
id. at 394 (Bailey statement), to acquire Toyota's techniques might, in itself, be an-
ticompetitive. See id. at 389 (Pertschuk statement). In response to this, the Bureau of
Competition has stated that Ford and Chrysler have ample opportunity to duplicate
GM's learning efficiencies with another Japanese firm. Id. However, the efficiencies
learned from Toyota cannot be at once both unique and easily duplicated. Id.
83. Id. at 386-87 (Miller statement). Although the majority of the Commission
stated confidently that the possibility of collusion was eliminated by the imposed re-
strictions, id., the two dissenting Commissioners noted that a horizontal joint venture
in a highly concentrated market is the combination most prone to collusion and spill-
over collusion. See id. at 393 (Bailey statement); id. at 388 (Pertschuk statement);
United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. at 170-72; Brunswick, 94 F.T.C. at
1265-66; Brodley,Joint Ventures, supra note 9, at 1552; Pitofsky, supra note 9, at 1035-
36. Because the structure of the GM-Toyota joint venture "necessitates coordina-
tion" of marketing and research efforts, GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 395 (Bailey state-
ment), the dissenting Commissioners determined that the collusion problem was "in-
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the venture would cause price escalations throughout the auto-
mobile industry. s4
F. The Importance of the GM-Toyota Decision as Precedent
Given the high concentration 8- and the high barriers to
entry86 in the United States automobile manufacturing market,
it would be inconsistent for the FTC to now prohibit similarly
structured ventures.8 7 Nevertheless, some have labelled the
curable," id., and that the majority's restrictions and reporting requirements were
"mostly cosmetic and unenforceable." Proposed Consent Agreement, 48 Fed. Reg.
at 57,252 (Pertschuk statement).
In addition to the provision allowing direct negotiations by GM and Toyota
whenever the pricing formula yields an unprofitable price, daily operations at the
Fremont plant would allow GM and Toyota to "glean enough additional hard data to
vastly improve educated guesses about each other's competitive activities." Id. at 395
(Bailey statement). "There does not have to be a complete swap of technical plans
for competition to be dulled." Id.
Finally, the language of the FTC decision itself in allowing the exchange of any
information "necessary to accomplish . . , the legitimate purposes," id. at 384, of the
joint venture is too vague to be strictly enforced. Id. at 396 (Bailey statement). The
language is "a highly significant loophole," vague enough, in fact, to have allowed
Toyota to suggest to GM a pricing schedule for the joint venture car relative to the
price of the Corolla prior to the FTC's final decision. Id. at 395-96.
84. See id. at 394 (Bailey statement). Collusion would be likely to cause an in-
crease not only in the joint venture vehicle's price, but also in prices throughout the
entire auto industry. Id. Toyota will be inclined to raise the Corolla's price, because
the increase would translate into a higher price for the joint venture vehicle to GM
and any decrease in the Corolla's price will result in a savings to GM. Id. This is
because the Corolla is heavily weighted in the pricing index for the joint venture
vehicle. Id. at 381. Because GM and Toyota are the industry price leaders, id. at 393
(Bailey statement), the other market participants would be likely to increase their
prices. Id. at 394. The cycle would be renewed when these new, higher prices are
reflected in the next year's market basket, ensuring "an ascending spiral of lockstep
pricing." Id. These potential price increases would be reflected throughout the en-
tire line of cars since manufacturers maintain a "consistent dollar gap ... between
each model further up the line." Id.
85. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 393 (Bailey statement). The automobile market
is oligopolistic. Id. An oligopolistic market is one in which a few relatively large
sellers account for all or the bulk of the output. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note
82, at 404a.
86. GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 393 (Bailey statement). "Entry barriers to [the
United States automobile manufacturing market] are obviously quite high." Id.; see
also supra note 58 (discussion of barriers to entry).
87. Id. at 392 (Bailey statement). It has been suggested that the GM-Toyota pre-
cedent might even extend to ajoint venture with two domestic parents. "If one can
convince the Justice Department or the FTC of legitimate procompetitive benefits
flowing from the joint venture... I think a domestic joint venture would be analyzed
very much the same way [as GM-Toyota] from a legal standpoint." Halverson, Market
Definition, Mergers and Joint Ventures, Panel Discussion, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
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GM-Toyota decision sui generis and an improper standard for
adjudication.88 However, it remains to be seen how the FTC
could "deny to other companies what [they] have authorized
for the industry giants." 89 Soon after the GM-Toyota consent
decree, both Chrysler and Ford announced agreements to be-
gin production joint ventures with Japanese automobile manu-
facturers. 90 Neither has yet been challenged.
III. IMPLEMENTING INDUSTRIAL POLICY THROUGH
THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Implementation of an industrial policy through relaxation
of the antitrust laws imposed on international joint ventures is
a superior form of industrial policy because it is easily
achieved 9' and because of the inherent opportunity it offers to
control any potentially damaging effects.92 A policy of this type
is especially preferable to trade barriers.9 3 The flexibility of
the FTC, its authority to establish reporting requirements, and
ability to monitor ongoing operations make it well suited to
262 (B. Hawk ed.) This is especially so if there is a "pervasive Washington feeling"
that the potential venturers are members of a distressed industry. Id. at 263.
88. GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 398 (Douglas statement). Commissioner Douglas
cautioned that the GM-Toyota decision was "sufficiently unique [sic] as to augur
against making any inferences as to how the Commission might view other produc-
tion joint ventures." Id.; see also Brodley, Limited Scope, supra note 62, at 223. "[GM-
Toyota] can be understood as motivated primarily by the desire to promote United
States competitiveness in the face of international competition, and as such it has
limited significance as a legal precedent," because promotion of United States com-
petitiveness in the world market "does not provide a suitable legal standard for adju-
dication." Id. at 223, 227. Brodley adds that courts have a difficult time in weighing
efficiencies. Id. at 227-28.
89. GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 392 (Bailey statement). Allowing a joint venture
between the first and third largest companies on the market signals that "any simi-
larly-structured joint venture between any other members of the industry must be
sanctioned . . . [iun effect this is rule making for the industry." Id. The GM-Toyota
precedent "allows virtually any automobile production joint venture imaginable." Id.
at 398 (Pertschuk statement). "The principles of legality for this joint venture cannot
be limited to one hermetically sealed experiment in Freemont (sic), California." Id. at
392 (Bailey statement).
90. See supra note 12.
91. In contrast to industrial policies requiring the creation of new agencies, an
industrial policy achieved through modification of the antitrust laws would not re-
quire creation of any new coordinating agency. See infra note 119 and accompanying
text.
92. The FTC has broad monitoring powers and has imposed extensive report-
ing requirements on the venturers. See supra notes 6, 73, 75 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
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implement an industrial policy.94 Finally, the antitrust laws are
not an inviolate body of law, but are already balanced against,
and in some cases subordinated to, other governmental poli-
cies. 95
A. The Effect of Trade Barriers on Domestic Industry and
International Trade
Most economists agree that the enactment of protectionist
legislation would be likely to trigger retaliatory trade barriers
that could lead to a global recession. 6 Nevertheless, the
United States Congress has continued to seek implementation
of trade barriers.9 7
Tariffs, quotas, and other trade barriers cause a reduction
in world productivity and therefore a reduction in the eco-
nomic welfare of the United States.9 8 In addition, trade re-
94. See supra note 7 (discussion of the FTC).
95. Blechman, supra note 7, at 69. The antitrust laws are not a"sacred cow," but
are already balanced against the patent laws, the act of state doctrine, which balances
antitrust and foreign policy, and the primary jurisdiction doctrine, which balances
antitrust against regulatory policies. Id.
96. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. In 1930, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Act greatly raised United States import duties, which reached a zenith at 59% in
1932. D. SALVATORE, INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMics 215 (1983). This tariff, in conjunc-
tion with the Great Depression, led to sharply decreased United States export and
world trade, see id., and was partially responsible for the extended duration of the
Great Depression. The disastrous effects of the Smoot-Hawley tariff were corrected
by the Trade Agreements Act of 1934. Id.
97. See, e.g., Roberts, Textile Curbs Win In Senate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1985, at
D I, col. 6; supra note 2.
98. See D. SALVATORE, supra note 96, at 186-88. Trade barriers come within the
broad classification of industrial policy, but are in fact the antithesis of the recom-
mendations of this Note. A large nation may initially benefit from implementation of
an optimum tariff. "The optimum tariff is that rate of tariff that maximizes the net
benefit resulting from improvement in the nation's terms of trade against the nega-
tive effect resulting from reduction in the volume of trade." Id. at 186. The imposi-
tion of a tariff causes a decline in trade that reduces the imposing nation's welfare.
The increase in terms of trade for the nation imposing the tariff leads to a more
serious reduction in welfare. "[A]s the terms of trade of the nation imposing the
tariff improve, those of the trade partner deteriorate, since they are inverse." Id. As a
result of the decrease in its terms of trade and volume of trade, "the trade partner is
likely to retaliate and impose an optimum tariff of its own." Id. at 187. This retalia-
tion leads to further reduction in trade volume. The first nation may then itself retal-
iate. Id. "If the process continues, all nations usually end up losing all or most of the
gains from trade." Id. Finally, even without retaliation, "the gains of the tariff-im-
posing nation are less than the losses of the trade partner, so that the world as a
whole is worse off than under free trade." Id.
Another problem with protective trade barriers is that protection for one indus-
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strictions do nothing to encourage industrial restructuring in
the protected industries. 99 These protective measures "shelter
companies and localities from their own mistakes," rather than
make them more efficient.'l° Import restrictions also generally
cause price increases.' 0 '
trial sector inevitably harms another sector. See Schultze, supra note 5, at 4. "For
example, the protection accorded U.S. textile manufacturers put clothing manufac-
turers at a disadvantage in world trade, because they had to pay higher prices for the
textiles they used." Reich, supra note 1, at 100. Protection of the steel industry
not only cost American consumers more than an estimated $1 billion annu-
ally in higher prices for U.S. products that contain steel but also penalize all
the U.S. industrial purchasers of steel-manufacturers of automobiles, farm
machinery, appliances, and machine tools-who now must pay 25 to 35 per-
cent more ... for the steel they use.
Id.
Two additional negative impacts of protectionist legislation also merit considera-
tion. There is evidence that United States protectionist devices have aidedJapan and
other developing exporters, such as Korea and Taiwan, by making them more "flexi-
ble and dynamic.., precisely because they have been forced to adapt to U.S. protec-
tionist policies." Id. Finally, in addition to slowing global trade in general, protec-
tionist measures have a particularly harsh impact on developing nations, "which des-
perately need foreign trade." Id. Existing restrictive bilateral trade agreements
between the United States and such countries as Mexico, Pakistan, and Brazil "bru-
tally retard these nations' economic growth, perpetuating poverty and perhaps
threatening world peace. And by choking off foreign earnings, they make it hard for
these countries to repay loans, thus threatening the stability of Western banks." Id.
Removal or reduction of trade barriers allows the United States to import prod-
ucts that can be produced more cheaply by foreign firms, which in turn allows the
United States to specialize in those goods made most cheaply here. FTC Bureau of
Economics Staff Report, Effects of Restrictions on United States Imports, June 1980, at 1.
Specialization and trade lead to greater economic welfare for all those involved. Id.
Therefore, elimination of trade barriers "increases income and provides consumers
with consumption possibilities otherwise unattainable." Id. at 2. Protectionist meas-
ures only increase prices. Present restrictions on clothing imports raise consumer
prices in the United States by U.S.$8 billion to U.S.$12 billion. See Protectionism That
Protects Nothing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1985, at A20, col. 1.
The United States recently increased duties on Italian pasta in retaliation for the
failure of the Common Market to reach a favorable resolution of a dispute over citrus
trade. Pasta Tariff Up in Retaliation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1985, at D5, col. 3. Europe-
ans warned that they would in turn retaliate by raising tariffs on United States wal-
nuts and lemons. Id. For a discussion of the European Economic Community, see
Note, Technology Transfers In the EEC: A Look At the Proposed Block Exemption for Exclusive
Patent Licensing Agreements, 7 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 244, 244 (1984).
99. See Crandall, What Have Auto-Import Quotas Wrought? Challenge, Jan-Feb.
1985, at 40, 43. The steel industry has been receiving protection of one type or
another for fifteen years and is still losing to foreign competition. Id.
100. Weidenbaum, Industrial Policy Is Not The Answer, Challenge, July-Aug. 1983,
at 22, 24.
101. Id. at 24. The VRA's with Japanese automobiles increased their prices by
well over $900 per car. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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Barring cooperative ventures, such as the GM-Toyota en-
terprise, by strict application of traditional antitrust formulas
will only further increase the public demand for protectionist
legislation. 0 2 To assuage the protectionist demands, and aid
industries unable to meet foreign competition, antitrust en-
forces should promote controlled international joint ventures
while gradually removing barriers to trade. 0 3
B. Industrial Policy and the Current Marketplace
Various industrial policies have been commonly practiced
by recent United States administrations. 0 4 The only real alter-
native to adopting a unified and effective form of industrial
policy is the current assortment of uncoordinated and often
antagonistic industrial policies.' 0 5 In light of this choice and
102. See Eizenstadt, Reindustrialization Through Government-Business-Labor Alliance,
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 107.
103. See supra note 98 (discussion of the effects of trade barriers).
104. See Eizenstadt, supra note 102, at 109-10. Examples of recent interventions
in the industrial sector include federal government support amounting to the cost of
one-half of the research and development in the United States, the Carter Adminis-
tration's revitalization of Chrysler, and the Reagan Administration's Export Trading
Company Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982). Government intervention
has often taken the form of direct subsidies and special tax breaks. See Reich, supra
note 1, at 98.
American industries threatened by foreign competition have also been
propped up by a wide assortment of government subsidies, special tax pro-
visions, and subsidized loans and loan guarantees. These forms of assist-
ance have mushroomed since the late 1960s, as global competitive pressures
have increased. In 1950, for example, the total cost (in 1978 dollars) to the
federal government of special tax credits and tax-depreciation allowances
going to individual industries amounted to only $7.9 billion (or approxi-
mately one percent of the gross national product). By 1980, the cost had
grown to a staggering $62.4 billion (almost 3 percent of that year's GNP).
In 1950, the cost to the government of subsidized loans and loan guarantees
to specific industries (measured in terms of interest charges and loan de-
faults) was only $300 million. By 1980 the annual cost had grown to $3.6
billion. Outstanding targeted federal loan guarantees now total more than
$221.6 billion. Taken together, subsidies, tax credits, and tax depreciation
allowances to promote industries rose from $8.2 billion (or one percent of
the GNP) in 1950 to $66 billion (3.1 percent of the GNP) in 1980.
Id. However, industrial policy effectiveness historically has been hindered by a lack
of coordination of federal agencies. See Eizenstadt, supra note 102, at 110.
105. See Eizenstadt, supra note 102, at 117.
The issue is not a choice between less or more government intervention.
The government, through Republican and Democratic administrations, is
constantly involved in decisions affecting particular industries. With the
steel industry, for example, there are a web of government environmental,
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the precarious condition of a number of United States indus-
tries, antitrust laws "cannot and should not stand in splendid
isolation from the real world decisions that have to be
made."1 06
C. Antitrust Laws Have Traditionally Promoted Competitiveness
Use of the antitrust laws to encourage international com-
petitiveness is not inconsistent with the history or purpose of
those laws.' 0 7  This Note does not suggest relaxation of the
antitrust laws in such traditional areas of concern as price fix-
ing or market division. 0 8 The antitrust laws have regularly un-
dergone revision, 10 9 as evidenced by the employment of new
analytical tools such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index." 0
The incorporation of these new instruments suggests that anti-
trust enforcers have always considered "various economic and
historical factors" in their analyses."' Additionally, the anti-
trust laws, like any other body of law, should be modified when
new conditions make the existing law unproductive."l 2
tax, tariff and quota actions directly affecting the industry, but made without
any overall policy. Thus, the real choice is between frequent ad hoc inter-
ventions and a more coordinated, synthesized policy.
Id. "The strongest argument for an industrial policy is a consideration of what the
alternatives (ad hoc government interventions) have brought: high levels of idle ca-
pacity, staggering unemployment .... and major international trade crises." Note,
Protecting Steel, supra note 39, at 885.
106. See Eizenstadt, supra note 102, at 111. "The rules of antitrust law as they
had developed were undermined by observation of how the world works." The End of
Antitrust, Wash. Post, Dec. 5, 1983, at A10, col. 2.
107. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
108. See Clanton, supra note 82, at 1239. Price fixing, market division and group
boycotts are still strictly forbidden. Id. In 1984 criminal enforcement actions against
bid rigging and price fixing were brought three times more frequently than similar
actions were brought in the 1970s, a decade noted for strict antitrust enforcement.
See Greenhouse, Making Mergers Even Easier, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1985, § 3, at 1, col.
2.
109. See supra notes 30, 31 (amendments to Clayton and FTC Acts).
110. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and consideration of entry barri-
ers are two examples of new analytical concepts employed by antitrust enforcers. See
1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 7. The HHI, a formula used in market power
calculations, consists of the sum of the squares of the market shares of all market
participants. See Note, International Joint Ventures, supra note 39, at 526 n. 114.
111. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 329 (1962).
112. After an 18-month study, the President's Commission on Industrial Com-
petitiveness concluded that antitrust laws "ignore global market realities." President's
Commission Suggests Ways to Enhance U.S. Competitiveness Worldwide, 48 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1203, at 371 (Feb. 21, 1985). Referring specifically to
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It is axiomatic that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to
protect "competition, not competitors. '  The majority of
the FTC explained that the GM-Toyota consent decree would
protect competition." 4 Refusal to approve the GM-Toyota
joint venture, on the other hand, could have resulted in global,
as well as domestic, anticompetitive developments, if GM were
to cease small car production. 1t5
D. Criticism of Industrial Policy
Industrial policy should not be used by proponents of the
free market to provoke an instinctively American aversion to
governmental interference in the marketplace. 1 6 Proponents
section seven of the Clayton Act, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige stated
that it has become "harmful to America's best interests because it is concerned with
an economic environment that no longer exists." Baldrige, supra note 1, at 401. In
1914, when the Clayton Act was passed, and in 1980, when it was last amended, the
United States was the number one worldwide manufacturer and had little interna-
tional competition. Id. at 399-400. In 1985, the situation is gravely different. See
supra note 1 and accompanying text. "A lot of people think our antitrust laws are like
the Holy Grail, that they shouldn't be tampered with .... [b]ut these laws should be
reviewed if the economic facts underlying their initial passage have changed."
Greenhouse, Making Mergers Even Easier, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1985, § 3, at 1, col. 2
(quoting M. Baldridge, Secretary of Commerce).
113. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344. "The essence of the competitive process is to
induce firms to become more efficient and to pass the benefits of the efficiency along
to consumers." E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653, 750-51 (1980). How-
ever, at an earlier stage in the development of the antitrust laws, more emphasis may
have been given to the preservation of small competitors. See United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344; supra note 18.
[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition
through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress
appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these com-
peting concerns in favor of decentralization. We must give effect to that
decision.
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344; see also B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 2 n.5 (1985) (discussion of the
effect of the Chicago School and its de-emphasis of concentration in the domestic
market); P. AREEDA, supra note 23, at 26-40 (discussion of competition and reasons
for de-emphasizing competition).
114. GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 386 (Miller statement). The result of the restric-
tions imposed by the majority of the FTC is that the "venture offers substantial bene-
fits to competition and U.S. consumers without incurring significant anticompetitive
risks." Id. at 388 (emphasis added). "Markets need not be atomistic to be competi-
tive or otherwise perform well (translation: 'big ain't necessarily bad')." Miller Inter-
view, supra note 19, at 8.
115. See supra notes 39, 47.
116. See Note, Trustbusting, supra note 44, at 1066. United States antitrust con-
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of an industrial policy and those who put their faith in the
workings of the free market both agree that there is a serious
economic decline in the United States." t 7 They disagree only
about its remedy." 8
Critics of an industrial policy involving assistance to indus-
try from several federal agencies contend that setting up an
effective coordinating mechanism to assure that the various
agencies do not conflict would be prohibitively difficult." 9
These critics also argue that there is no evidence that financial
planners in government would be any more successful than
those in private business. 120  Such criticism is speculative and
largely irrelevant to the type of industrial policy advocated
here.' 2 ' Instead of the active governmental intervention envi-
cepts have roots in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of individualism. Id. Reasonable in-
dustrial policy has the same goal as reasonable antitrust law: a healthy and competi-
tive economy. Caspari,Joint Ventures-The Intersection of Antitrust and Industrial Policy in
the EEC, in 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. ch. 22 (B. Hawk ed.) (forthcoming). As
stated by Chairman Miller, when analyzing the problems involved in GM-Toyota, it is
important to separate "reality from rhetoric." GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 386 (Miller
statement). More radical commentators have sought the abolition of United States
antitrust laws. See Thurow, Let's Abolish Antitrust, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1980, § 3, at 2,
col. 2.
117. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 1, at 97; Schultze, supra note 5, at 3; Weiden-
baum, supra note 100, at 23.
118. See, e.g., Miller, Reindustrialization Through the Free Market, 53 ANTITRUST L.J.
121 (1984); Reich, supra note 1, at 97; Schultze, supra note 5, at 3; Weidenbaum, supra
note 100, at 23.
119. See, e.g., Ordover, Transnational Antitrust and Economics, in 1984 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 233, 248 (B. Hawk ed.). An industrial policy contemplating coopera-
tion between the federal agencies that administer the various regulations affecting
international businesses, for example tax, commerce, and antitrust regulators, in or-
der to give the industry in question the greatest advantage, conceivably requires the
creation of another agency to coordinate these actions. Many commentators believe
that the creation of such a coordinating mechanism would be extremely difficult. See
id. "The President [Reagan] never developed a trade policy during his first term...
in part because the officials involved in trade could not agree among themselves ......
Kilborn, How the Big Six Steer the Economy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1985, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
120. See Schultze, supra note 5, at 7-9. Another criticism of industrial policy is
that it causes wasteful reapportionment of resources. According to this argument
companies subject to increased governmental regulation will have to allocate in-
creased resources to governmental and "legal activities" such as lobbying and litiga-
tion. Weidenbaum, supra note 100, at 23. However, relaxation of antitrust strictures
will not encourage increased lobbying efforts, because the establishment of well-de-
fined precedents will insure consistent treatment. Similarly, relaxation of antitrust
enforcement and the establishment of clear precedents should result in reduced legal
expenses, as the FTC and Department ofJustice will bring actions less frequently.
121. Critics who attack an industrial policy in which the government adopts any
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sioned by most critics of industrial policy, relaxation of the en-
forcement of the antitrust laws is a passive form of intervention
that employs the judgment of private businessmen for many of
the initial decisions regarding the joint venture. 122 The FTC's
role is to then impose restrictions that insure minimal anticom-
petitive effects and maximal benefits. In order for this indus-
trial policy to be of greatest benefit to both the United States
and the world economies, however, it must be accompanied by
a reduction of trade barriers.123
E. Problems with a Free Market Approach
Even if market forces 2 4 would eventually forge a more ef-
and every conceivable type of assistance and protection program, fail to recognize
that no one has proposed such a policy. See, e.g., Shultze, supra note 5, at 3.
122. Private businessmen would set up the venture, making all the decisions
concerning location, timing, product, market, and at least initially, size and structure
of the venture, including partner selection.
123. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. Reduction of trade barriers
improves the global economy, which directly benefits each individual nation's econ-
omy. See supra note 98. But it must also be noted that
a liberal trade policy which promotes imports also reduces the need for an
activist antitrust policy: unconstrained flows of foreign goods and capital
investment serve as constraining forces on the ability of the domestic firms
to elevate prices and harm domestic citizens. Also, when liberal trade policy
exposes domestic firms to competition at home and abroad, it becomes es-
pecially important that antitrust policy does not become an efficiency-reduc-
ing burden on the home firms in their global rivalry with foreign firms which
are not likewise disadvantaged.
Ordover, supra note 119, at 244.
Relaxation of antitrust laws in conjunction with reduction of trade barriers therefore
appears to be the best solution to current United States trade deficits.
124. "Free market" today is a purely theoretical concept and in this context
means little more than various uncoordinated industrial policies. See Note, Interna-
tional Joint Ventures, supra note 39, at 538. The United States automobile market is not
a free market. Id. One commentator has called the free market a "highly artificial
concept." Reich, supra note 1, at 108.
The enduring myth of the unmanaged market illustrates the power of ideol-
ogy over political reality. The broad array of tariffs, quotas, voluntary ex-
port agreements, and bailouts for declining businesses that now pervades
our economic system is somehow considered an isolated exception to the
government's normal role of benign neglect, while our defense-related con-
tracts, targeted tax breaks, and assorted subsidies for particular industries
are seen as separate issues, unrelated to industrial development or to the
dynamics of the market. Many Americans object to the subsidies foreign
governments offer their emerging industries but then fail to acknowledge
the seminal role defense and aerospace projects play in the development of
our own emerging industries. We demand that foreign governments reduce
the procurement preferences they give certain of their domestic industries
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ficient industrial base in the United States, a recovery of dis-
tressed industries shaped purely by market forces would take
years, making it plainly unacceptable to those presently, and
perhaps soon to be, out of work. 12 5 Additionally, free market
forces would achieve this restructuring only at tremendous
cost, including the loss of capital invested in plants and equip-
ment, and the uprooting of large numbers of workers. 12 6
Furthermore, considering the competitive advantages en-
joyed by many foreign companies, free market success is spec-
ulative. 127 In contrast, the type of industrial policy that the
FTC has begun to implement with GM-Toyota has already led
to similar international joint ventures. 28 For the above rea-
sons, relaxation of antitrust enforcement against international
joint ventures is a superior industrial policy, which, in light of
the variety of remedial tools available to the FTC, should be
widely employed.
IV. THE TYPES OF RESTRICTIONS THAT SHOULD BE
IMPOSED ON FUTURE VENTURES
The key to the effective relaxation of antitrust standards as
applied to international joint ventures is the imposition by the
FTC of carefully selected restrictions. The goals of these re-
strictions are twofold: 1) to limit the potential anticompetitive
effects of the venture, including protection of the consumer
but then demand that our own large, regulated manufacturers buy only
from American producers. In short, our mythic assumptions lag behind our
economic reality: every industry in America is deeply involved with and de-
pendent on government. The competitive position of every American firm
is affected by government policy.
Id.
125. See Note, Protecting Steel, supra note 39, at 884.
126. Id. Entire industrial towns would also be disrupted. Id.
127. See Hawk, supra note 45, at 231. United States firms have to comply with
strict antitrust laws to which foreign firms are not subject. Id. Foreign governments
often promote the international competitiveness of their industries through the coor-
dinated effort of their financial and regulatory agencies. See Blechman, supra note 7,
at 76. For example, the EEC sponsors several joint ventures including Airbus (a
transportation project) and Esprit (an electronics project). Id. The EEC gives "block
exemptions" from antitrust scrutiny to industries they wish to encourage. Caspari,
supra note 116. Finally, United States exporters face over 200 foreign trade barriers.
See Farnsworth, 200 Foreign Barriers to U.S. Exports Listed, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1985, at
D 1, col. 1. Japan has the most trade barriers of any foreign country. Id.
128. See supra note 12 (discussion of international joint ventures similar to the
GM-Toyota joint venture).
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when foreign competition abates, and 2) to derive maximum
procompetitive benefits from the venture, particularly benefits
to the global competitiveness of United States industries.129
Central to all the restrictions imposed on a joint venture is the
concept that the venture will be limited to that which is "rea-
sonably necessary"' 0 to attain the desired procompetitive
benefits. The need for restrictions to maximize procompeti-
tive benefits to United States industries may be less obvious
than the need for restrictions to protect consumers. However,
many previous protectionist measures enacted by the United
States for the benefit of specific industrial sectors were based
on an understanding that that sector would take steps, while
protected, to restructure itself in order to better meet global
competition.131 In most cases these steps were not taken.' 32
A. Restrictions Designed to Limit Potential Anticompetitive Effects
The most basic restrictions are in the form of output and
duration limitations, such as those imposed by the FTC on the
GM-Toyota venture. 33 Output and duration limitations will
tend to reinforce whatever disincentive to collusion existed ab-
sent the joint venture, because they remind the venturers that
129. See Proposed Consent Agreement, 48 Fed. Reg. at 57, 316. The FTC ma-
jority stated there was little possibility of the venture's exerting anticompetitive mar-
ket power. Id.
Given the characteristics of the automobile market, it appears that the joint
venture will not result in an increased risk of tacit or explicit collusion.
Automobiles are highly differentiated in terms of quality, performance, ap-
pearance, and durability. The demand for cars shows cyclical swings. Be-
cause firms have unequal cost structures, each firm has a different profit-
maximizing price. These and other characteristics make a collusive agree-
ment difficult to establish and maintain.
Id. (footnote omitted).
130. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 376 (Complaint).
131. See Reich, supra note 1, at 99. Federal protection to the textile, footwear,
color-television, automobile and steel industries has been "premised on the ... in-
dustry's implicit agreement to use the opportunity to retool ... because that agree-
ment was never made formal, the government and the public have no recourse now
that these investment plans are falling short .... Id. The steel industry, in particu-
lar, despite extensive protection, is spending its cash on diversifying into other sec-
tors rather than restructuring. See Teitelman, Smart fish in a shrinking pond, Forbes,
Dec. 30, 1985, at 46. U.S. Steel, for example, the largest steel-maker in the United
States, "has cut capacity 24% in the last six years and is now diversifying into every-
thing from banking to the oil business." Id.
132. Teitelman, supra note 131, at 46.
133. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 383 (Order); see also supra note 72.
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they will eventually be competitors again. 13 4 However, as out-
put limits can decrease the efficiency of ajoint venture,135 their
application must be carefully considered. It is possible that, in
GM-Toyota, the FTC could have achieved the same disincen-
tives to collusion solely through duration restrictions. Such
restrictions may have provided sufficient reminder that the ex-
tent of the cooperation was limited. As duration restrictions
may also decrease efficiency, however, flexible duration restric-
tions based on changes in the intensity of foreign competition
may maximize efficiency. 13
6
Restrictions on information exchanged and compliance
monitoring procedures, such as those required by the FTC in
GM-Toyota, 137 must be imposed in all cases to reduce the po-
tential for collusion. The type of information restricted may
vary according to the venture involved, but should always in-
clude pricing and marketing data. 138 Because exchange of
pricing information is particularly dangerous to competition,
highly structured pricing systems, which operate to set auto-
matic prices independently of the venturers, should be im-
posed whenever possible. 139 Effective monitoring may require
an FTC observer at management meetings, or, when feasible,
at the daily operations of the venture.140
Another restriction that can reduce potential anticompeti-
tive effects is the requirement that a joint venturer seek an al-
ternative partner. 14 ' A cooperative venture between the first
and twentieth largest market participants presents fewer an-
ticompetitive risks than an identical venture between the first
134. See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 688-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
135. See P. AREEDA, supra note 23, 117. Some industries, such as the automo-
bile industry, require huge production in order to achieve efficiency. See id.
136. See P. AREEDA, supra note 23, 117. In the face of continuing pressure it
may be desirable to extend the duration of the venture.
137. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
138. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 14.
139. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 394-95 (Bailey statement). Commissioner Bai-
ley noted that a "non-competitor-based" pricing formula "triggered by a cost index"
not under control of one of the parents was suggested to the Commission for appli-
cation in GM-Toyota. Id.
140. The parties to the venture should bear the cost of the observer if an ob-
server is deemed necessary.
141. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 389 (Pertschuk statement); see supra notes 22,
36 (discussion of traditional antitrust concerns).
1986]
292 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 9:257
and third largest market participants. 4 2 It is not clear that
Toyota was the best partner for GM in terms of efficiencies
gained and in terms of anticompetitive potential.' 43 Alterna-
tive partners should be analyzed carefully by the FTC and the
decision approving a particular parent should be justified
fully. 144
B. Restrictions Designed to Maximize Procompetitive Benefits
A major goal of the industrial policy recommended in this
Note is the creation of jobs in the United States. Therefore
international joint ventures coming under this policy might be
required to maintain a percentage of production facilities in
the United States. United States-based production is also cen-
tral to dissemination of learning benefits among domestic
workers. This restriction was not placed on the GM-Toyota
venture; either parent could move the production site to Ja-
pan, or elsewhere. 141
Requiring the United States parent to invest a percentage
of its profits into research and development and employee ed-
ucation could also encourage long-term competitiveness. The
United States lags behind Japan in percentage of profits in-
vested in research and development, and behind all Western
nations in employee education, factors often cited as harmful
to the United States' future competitiveness. 46
142. See supra notes 22, 36 (discussion of traditional antitrust concerns).
143. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 389 (Pertschuk statement).
144. The FTC should indicate in their decision why the non-domestic parent
was accepted. The FTC majority did not indicate why Toyota rather than a smaller
Japanese automobile manufacturer was chosen. See id. It is possible that the procom-
petitive aspects of the joint venture could have been achieved in large part through
an alternative partner. See id. at 396 (Bailey statement); supra note 81.
145. See generally GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 383-86 (Order); see supra note 82
(Toyota may move the location of the venture).
146. See Aho, Trying Harder, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1985, (Book Review), at 32.
The United States must "fundamentally [alter] the allocation of resources to research
and development, education . . . [wihile many of the brightest young people in this
country go to law school, Japan, with half the population, graduates more engineers.
With two-thirds the gross national product, Japan invests more in absolute terms in
plant and equipment." Id. Additionally, United States industries must allocate more
resources to worker retraining programs, to prepare workers to perform the in-
creased number of more highly skilled jobs which will result from restructuring. See
Reich, supra note 1, at 102. "Alone of all the Western industrialized nations the
United States lacks any retraining program available to the majority of its labor
force." Id.
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Regulation of the manufacturing of the joint venture
product may be necessary to ensure the greatest dissemination
of learning benefits and a high demand for United States labor.
It is estimated that over sixty percent of each GM-Toyota joint
venture vehicle will be built in Japan solely by Toyota.147 GM
can gain little knowledge about the manufacture of this portion
of the car, and United States labor can be employed to assem-
ble only the remaining forty percent of the vehicle. Regula-
tions of joint ventures between companies with a line of prod-
ucts may require subject matter restrictions. For example, in
the GM-Toyota joint venture, joint production of only a single
vehicle model was necessary to achieve the anticipated
procompetitive benefits. 14 8
Because the dissemination of learning efficiencies
throughout United States industry was a primary concern of
the Commission in GM-Toyota, steps should be taken to facili-
tate this process. 1 4 9 Dissemination could be insured by requir-
ing the United States parent to allow its competitors access to
the newly acquired information, in some fashion or after some
period of time, in order to allow the parent to make a reason-
able profit. 5 0
CONCLUSION
Because the FTC may consider and impose any restriction
necessary to guard against anticompetitive effects,'5 compa-
nies in all distressed sectors 152 should be prompted to examine
their options under the GM-Toyota precedent. The GM-Toyota
147. See Proposed Consent Agreement, 48 Fed. Reg. at 57,252 (Pertschuk state-
ment).
148. See GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 383 (Order).
149. See id. at 388 (Miller statement).
150. Denial of access to information should be permitted only when necessary
to the success of the venture. See Brodley, Analyzing Joint Ventures With Foreign Partners,
53 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 80 (1984); cf. GM-Toyota, 103 F.T.C. at 389 (Pertschuk state-
ment) (if the information is unique, allowing GM to acquire it may be anticompeti-
tive).
151. See Brunswick, 657 F.2d at 982. The FTC has " 'wide discretion in its choice
of a remedy deemed adequate to cope with' " any anticompetitive practices. Id.
(quotingJacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U.S. 608, 611 (1946)).
152. In addition to the automobile sector, distressed sectors include, inter alia,
the steel, footwear, textile, and semiconductor sectors. See supra note 11. The bur-
den of establishing that a company is from a distressed industrial sector falls on the
company wishing to initiate an international joint venture.
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consent decree, though perhaps imperfect,15 3 is an important
step towards needed industrial restructuring in the United
States. An industrial policy encouraging international joint
ventures combined with the reduction of protectionist trade
barriers will stimulate the United States and world economies.
Proper application of the many flexible restrictions available to
the FTC can minimize the potential anticompetitive effects of
these international joint ventures and maximize their procom-
petitive benefits.
Paul C. Cumin
153. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. The GM-Toyota consent de-
cree has been called "disappointingly blurry." Clanton, supra note 82, at 1264. But
see Halverson, supra note 7, at 183 (GM-Toyota suggests a "new willingness of the
antitrust enforcement agencies" to consider economic reality). Although the dissent-
ing Commissioners raise some questions yet to be fully answered, the GM-Toyota pre-
cedent is a practical and expedient response to one of the most serious economic
problems currently facing the United States.
